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Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the
Erosion of Informed Consent
Mat Lamkin'
INTRODUCTION
MAGINE yOu are recovering from breast cancer treatment. Over the
past year, you have had a mastectomy followed by five months of
chemotherapy. While the nausea and memory loss caused by your therapy
have receded, you continue to suffer from fatigue and headaches. Your
doctor recommends you take a drug called tamoxifen for the next five years
to reduce the risk of your cancer recurring. You begin taking the drug but
find that it causes extremely unpleasant side effects, including hot flashes,
severe joint pain, and exacerbated fatigue. These side effects erode your
ability to perform at work and to engage in the lives of your children.
Having just endured the tribulations of surgery and chemotherapy, you
conclude you would rather assume a higher risk of recurrence than suffer
these side effects for the next five years. Your doctor has a different view.
While she acknowledges that tamoxifen's side effects can be unpleasant,
she insists taking the drug is crucial to protecting your long-term health.
Who should decide whether you continue to take tamoxifen? As a
matter of medical ethics there is no question. Competent patients have
the right to determine for themselves whether a drug's risks outweigh
its potential benefits-a right embodied in the general requirement that
patients voluntarily consent to any course of treatment! But your situation
is complicated by the health insurance offered by your employer. Last
year your employer increased the deductible in its employee health plan
from $400 for family coverage to $4,400.' You can reduce that deductible
i Fellow, Center for Law & the Biosciences, Stanford Law School. J.D., Northwestern
University School of Law; M.A., University of Minnesota (Bioethics); A.B., Princeton
University. Thanks to Hank Greely for his thoughtful comments, and to the Stanford Law
School Fellows for their valuable input.
2 See Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914) (Cardozo, J.) ("Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body...."), abrogated by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.zd 3 (N.Y. 1957); RUTH R. FADEN &
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 8 (1986).
3 David S. Hilzenrath, Wellness Incentives Could Create Health-Care Loophole, WASH. POST,
October 16, 2oo9, at Aol (describing a wellness program implemented by a large auto parts
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to the prior, lower amount by participating in your employer's "wellness
program," which requires employees to meet the company's targets for
cholesterol level, blood pressure, and body mass index. 4 Because your
condition makes it unreasonably difficult for you to reach those targets,
your employer has agreed to offer you the lower deductibles as long as you
follow your doctor's treatment recommendations--which include taking
tamoxifen. In order for you to obtain the lower-cost insurance, your doctor
must verify to the wellness program's administrator that you have complied
with her recommendations.6
If you made significantly more money you would be willing to pay the
increased deductible to forgo taking tamoxifen, but at your income you
struggle to afford health insurance even at the lower rate. Accordingly, if
you cannot persuade your doctor to change her recommendation, you face
a choice between taking tamoxifen or losing access to affordable health
insurance for your family. If you agree to take tamoxifen under these
circumstances, is your consent voluntary? Should the law allow employers
to impose such a choice on employees?
Proponents of tying employees' insurance rates to their health
behaviors emphasize that individuals' decisions can impose hardships on
others. An employee's health care costs are shared by fellow employees
who are insured under their employer's health plan.7 When an employee
experiences expensive health problems that could have been avoided
by taking medications, quitting smoking, or losing weight, all employees
can expect their costs to rise.8 To the extent employees' health behaviors
drive up the cost of coverage, their actions can help push insurance out of
reach for fellow employees.9 Higher health insurance costs also undermine
employers' competitiveness, which can cause them to pay lower salaries,
lay off employees, or hire fewer people."° In recognition of how individuals'
company).
4 Id.
5 See 29 C.ER. § 2590.7o2(f)(3)(exs. 3-4) (2012) (endorsing wellness programs that ac-
commodate sick employees by providing discounts in exchange for following their doctors'
recommendations).
6 See BLUE CARE NETWORK OF MIcH., HEALTHY BLUE LIVING: MEMBER GUIDE I (201 I),
http://www.mibcn.com/pdf/member/hblMemberGuideBrochure.pdf (describing the terms of
a wellness program that requires employees' doctors to verify the employees' compliance
with doctors' treatment plans).
7 See Consumer Guide to Group Health Insurance, NAT'L ASS'N OF HEALTH UNDERWRITERS,
http://nahu.org/consumer/GroupInsurance.cfm (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
8 See id.
9 See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health
Insurance Premiums, 24 J. LAB. ECON. 609, 609-12 (2OO6).
lO Id.; Neeraj Sood et al., Employer-Sponsored Insurance, Health Care Cost Growth, and the
Economic Performance of U.S. Industries, 44 HEALTH SERV. RES. 1449, 1457 (2009) ("[A] iO per-
cent increase in 'excess' growth in health care costs ... would have resulted in 12o,803 fewer
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behaviors and medical decisions affect the health care costs of an entire
pool, proponents argue wellness programs can not only improve health and
drive down costs, but can promote fairness by rewarding employees who
make responsible choices.
While the idea of reducing costs by improving health has enormous
political appeal, recent enthusiasm for wellness programs has obscured how
these programs can undermine the competing value of patient autonomy-
the idea that decisions about the risks and benefits of medical interventions
should be made by the people who have to live with an illness and the
effects of any treatment." By conditioning employees' access to affordable
health insurance on their compliance with certain prescribed behaviors,
wellness programs can threaten informed consent, patient privacy and,
ironically, patient health itself. Accordingly, the laws governing wellness
programs should be amended to strike a better balance between patient
autonomy and responsible stewardship of health care resources.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I examines how rapidly escalating
health care expenditures in the United States drive interest in strategies to
reduce costs by improving health, including a growing interest in using
financial incentives to motivate employees to make specific behavioral
changes. Part II describes concerns raised by wellness programs, including
the widely acknowledged risk of discrimination against sick and disabled
people and the largely ignored potential for these programs to erode
employee autonomy. Part III casts doubt on a key rationale supporting
wellness programs-the idea that incursions on employee autonomy are
justified because patients will benefit as a result. This section considers how
wellness programs can harm patients by threatening their privacy, health,
and self-determination. Part IV argues that while existing legal protections
for employees in wellness programs protect against the potential for
discrimination, they are ill-suited to address qualitatively different concerns
about patient autonomy. This section offers specific recommendations to
limit employers' ability to condition access to affordable health insurance
on employees' compliance with wellness program requirements.
I. THE HEALTH CARE COST CRISIS AND THE IMPETUS
FOR WELLNESS STRATEGIES
The United States' exploding health care expenditures, and the
poor value it receives in return, may be the preeminent domestic policy
challenge of our time." The U.S. spends far more on health care per capita
jobs, US$28,022 million in lost gross output, and US$14,o82 million in lost value added ...
in 2005.").
i i FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 2.
12 See, e.g., Obama Taps Daschle as 'Lead Architect' of Health Care Plan, CNN (Dec. ii,
2oo8), http://articles.cnn.com/2oo8-12-1 i/politics/transition.wrap_ ioffice-of-health-re-
2oi2-2o13]
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than any other country, yet positive outcomes lag far behind countries that
spend much less.'3 For state and federal governments, health care costs
consume an ever-increasing share of tax dollars, 4 making fewer resources
available for other important purposes-including preventive measures
that might do more to promote public health than treating illnesses.
Rising costs also undermine the competitiveness of U.S. businesses,
making companies' products and services more expensive, hurting sales,
and discouraging employers from hiring workers.'5 Even among people
whose jobs offer health benefits, rising employee contributions can render
insurance unaffordable. 16
This crisis has spawned enormous interest in slowing the growth of
health care spending but has produced little progress toward that goal. As
shown by the political firestorm over "rationing" during the health care
reform debate in 2010, cutting services is profoundly unpopular among
voters. 7 Accordingly, preventive measures that could reduce demand for
expensive health care services are highly attractive. In particular, many
policymakers 18 and health care payers19 see an opportunity to bend the cost
curve by encouraging people to undertake healthful behaviors that can
reduce the incidence of chronic diseases and better manage these illnesses.
Nearly half of all Americans suffer from one or more chronic illnesses,
like diabetes, heart disease, and obesity.2 0 Treating chronic diseases accounts
for the vast majority of U.S. health care expenditures."' To some health
care reformers this bad news is also the good news, in that there are well-
established ways to reduce the disease burden from chronic illnesses-if
we can motivate people to change certain behaviors. For example, obese
form-health-care-employee-health-benefits-program (quoting former Sen. Tom Daschle
arguing that "fixing health care is and has been for many years our largest domestic policy
challenge").
13 See INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcAD., THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS
AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES 5-6 (Peirre L. Yong et al. eds., 2oio).
14 See id. at 5.
15 Baicker & Chandra, supra note 9, at 61o; Sood et al., supra note 1O.
I6 See Jon R. Gabel et al., Trends in Underinsurance and the Affordability of Employer
Coverage, 2004-2007, 28 HEALTH AFF. w595, w595 (2009).
17 Edward J. Larson, Medical Rationing, Death Panels and the Rising Cost of Health Care:
Whittier Law School Health Law Symposium Paper, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 13, 13-15 (2011 ).
18 David S. Hilzenrath, A Success Story That Isn't Shapes Health-Care Debate, WASH. POST,
Jan. 17, 20o, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/zoio-o1-I7/business/36834314_I-burd-
health-care-costs-health-care-costs.
19 AON HEWITT, 2011 HEALTH CARE SURVEY, 34 (201 I), available at http://insight.aon.
com/?elqPURLPage=5259.
20 GERARD ANDERSON, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, CHRONIC CARE:
MAKING THE CASE FOR ONGOING CARE, 4-5 (zoio), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/
dam/web-assets/20 i olo i/chronic-care.
21 Id. at 14.
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people are at an increased risk of developing type 2 diabetes, numerous
cardiovascular diseases, asthma, osteoarthritis, and many types of cancer."2
Similarly, cigarette smoking increases individuals' risk of high blood
pressure, heart disease, diabetes, various pulmonary diseases, and several
cancers.2 3 Since smoking and obesity are significant drivers of health care
costs, Z4 getting people to quit smoking or to lose weight could dramatically
reduce health care expenditures.
As for people who already suffer from chronic illnesses, there is
evidence that some simple interventions may help patients better manage
these conditions and minimize the risk of expensive and debilitating
complications.2 5 Because at least half of all people with chronic illnesses
fail to adhere to their doctors' prescriptions, 6 many policymakers see a
significant opportunity to reduce health care costs by encouraging patients
to take their medications as prescribed.
The potential to reduce health care costs by improving health-and
the popularity of this approach among voters-has attracted the interest
of Congress. 7 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(the "ACA")2 expands on provisions in the Health Insurance Portability
22 Daphne P. Guh et al., The Incidence of Co-Morbidities Related to Obesity and Overweight.-
A Systematic Review andMeta-Analysis, 9 BMC PUB. HEALTH 88 (2OO9), at I, available at http://
www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/9/88.
23 See, e.g., CDC Fact Sheet - Tobacco-Related Mortality - Smoking & Tobacco Use, http://
www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data-statistics/fact-sheets/health-effects/tobacco-related-mortality/
(last updated Mar. 21, 2011 ).
24 See, e.g., Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy, and Ethics of Employers' Use of
Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450,450 (2011). The authors state:
By one estimate, [obesity] is responsible for almost 1o percent of medical spending
in the United States, or about $147 billion per year. Smoking increases the risk of
heart disease, stroke, lung disease, and cancer; it accounts for nearly 20 percent
of deaths each year in the United States and about $96 billion in health care
expenditures.
Id.
25 NAT'L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, TiE POWER
OF PREVENTION, 8-9 (zn9), available at www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/pdf/2oo 9 -Power-of-
Prevention.pdf.
26 EDUARDO SABATE, WORLD HEALTH ORG., ADHERENCE TO LONG-TERM THERAPIES:
EVIDENCE FOR ACTION 7 (2003) (finding that half of patients with chronic diseases do not take
their medications as prescribed); see also Laura Landro, The Pharmacist Is In and Nudging You to
Take Your Pills, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2012, at D I ("Studies show only 25% to 30% of medica-
tions are taken properly, and only 15% to 20% are refilled as prescribed.").
27 See, e.g., Jordan Rau, Poll: Many Employees Don't Want Changes in Their Health Insurance,
PBS NEwsHOUR (August 30, 2011, 2:53 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2oI 1/o8/
poll-employees-dont-want-changes-in-their-health-insurance.html (sixty-eight percent of
surveyed employees supported wellness programs as a method of reducing health insurance
costs).
28 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I- 148, 124 Stat. 1 19 (2010)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2012-2O131
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and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") 9 that allow companies to offer
employees incentives to meet health targets, subject to certain restrictions
designed to prevent discrimination against sick people. The ACA increased
the size of incentives that are permitted by fifty percent, in the hope
that larger incentives would better motivate employees to change health
behaviors.3"
A growing number of health care payers-including employers, insurers,
and state Medicaid programs-are taking advantage of these provisions.3"
Aon Hewitt's annual survey of more than 1000 employers offering health
benefits found that in 2011 nearly eighty percent of these companies were
seeking to encourage employees to take responsibility for their health
"by offering tools (e.g., health risk assessment, biometric testing) to raise
participants' awareness of their health status and risks ... ."'I But many
employers have found this type of "voluntary"33 program ineffective
at motivating employees to adopt healthier behaviors.' Accordingly,
employers have shown an increasing interest in programs that use financial
incentives to motivate employees to change their behavior.35 In the Aon
29 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. to4-191
, I io
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered U.S.C. sections).
30 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I I 1-148, § 10408, 124 Stat.
119,977-78 (201 o) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §247b-9g). The ACA also includes other provi-
sions designed to encourage the proliferation of wellness programs, including appropriating
$200 million for grants to small businesses that implement wellness programs that include
"mechanisms to encourage employee participation" and "initiatives to change unhealthy be-
haviors and lifestyle choices." Id. In addition, the ACA instructs the CDC to provide technical
assistance to help employers evaluate their wellness programs, including the effectiveness of
"methods to increase participation of employees in such programs" and the effects of these
programs on employees' health status, productivity, and medical costs. ld. § 4303, at 582-83
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 28o/). The ACA also directs the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to establish a demonstration project in which ten States will apply the Act's well-
ness provisions to insurers offering health insurance in the individual market. Id. § 10504, at
1004-05 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 256).
31 Notably, the Affordable Care Act bars the federal government from implementing
wellness programs for federal employees. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, § 4303, 124 Stat. 119, 582-84 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 28ol-3)
(entitled "Prohibition of Federal Workplace Wellness Requirements").
32 AON HEWI', 2011 HEALTH CARE SURVEY, 34 (20I i), available at http://insight.aon.
com/?elqPURLPage=5259.
33 "A wellness program is 'voluntary' as long as an employer neither requires participa-
tion nor penalizes employees who do not participate." EEOC, Enforcement Guidance:Disabiliiy-
Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) (July 27, 2ooo), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
34 Ann Hendrix & Joshua Buck, Employer-Sponsored Wellness Programs: Should Your
Employer Be The Boss of More Than Your Work?, 38 Sw. L. REV. 465,469 (2009).
35 See, e.g., Mike Colias, Obese Police: Firms Force Workers to Slim Down, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.
(Feb. 26, 2007), http:llwww.chicagobusiness.com/article2007022 6 [NEWS/200023993.
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Hewitt survey, eighty-six percent of employers indicated they plan to
implement incentive programs within the next three to five years. 36
Employers use wellness incentives in several ways. Some offer
employees a one-time cash payment in exchange for getting a health
evaluation that can help them identify potential problems before they
materialize.37 Others eliminate co-pays for certain drugs to ensure that
patients are not deterred from taking medications because of their cost.3"
An increasingly popular approach involves tying financial incentives to
employees' compliance with specific health requirements.39 For example,
some companies offer health plans that tie employees' health insurance
contributions (such as premiums and deductibles) to their achievement of
particular health outcomes, such as reaching a certain cholesterol count or
body mass index.4° Some programs frame these incentives as "rewards" in
the form of discounts for employees who meet the targets, while others
frame them as penalties (i.e., higher contributions) imposed on those who
fail to meet the targets.41 In either case, the result is that employees who do
not meet the targets pay more for health insurance. 41
Other programs tie incentives not to health outcomes but to undertaking
certain activities, such as walking a certain amount each week or attending
"disease management" programs that educate employees about managing
36 AON HEwiTr, supra note 32, at 37.
37 Francine Knowles, Bosses to Employees: Shape Up or Pay Up, CHI. SUN TIMES, http://
www.suntimes.com/news/metro/6859o55-4 I 8/bosses-to-employees-shape-up-or-pay-
up.html (last updated Nov. 16, 201i).
38 For additional discussion of this approach, often referred to as "Value-Based Benefit
Design" (VBBD) or "Value-Based Insurance Design" (VBID), see SPENCER S. JONES ET AL.,
RAND CORP., POWER TO THE PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF CONSUMER-CONTROLLED PERSONAL HEALTH
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH CARE BENEFITS, 10-I I
(zoi ), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional-papers/2olI/RANDOP3s2.
pdf; Lucinda Jesson, Weighing the Wellness Programs: The Legal Implications of Imposing Personal
Responsibility Obligations, 15 VA. J. Soc. PoL'Y & L. 217, 226 (2008).
39 See, e.g., AON HEWIr, supra note 32, at 42 ("Monetary incentives used to promote
participation in health improvement/wellness programs increased 22 percentage points from
37% in 2010 to 59% in 201 I, and employers offering monetary incentives for disease/condition
management program participation almost tripled, increasing by 37 percentage points from
2010 to 2011."); Madison et al., supra note 24, at 451 ("[T/he prevalence of these programs will
increase rapidly; for example, about 40% of employers report an intention to implement bio-
metric outcome incentives in 2011 or later."). States are also increasingly taking this approach,
with more than half of all state Medicaid agencies considering using financial incentives to
promote healthy behaviors. JESSICA GREENE, CTR. FOR HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES, INC., STATE
APPROACHES TO CONSUMER DIRECTION IN MEDICAID (2007), http://www.chcs.org/usr-doc/
StateApproaches-toConsumerDirection.pdf.
40 Jesson, supra note 38, at 229.
41 AON HEWlr, supra note 32, at 37-38; Madison et al., supra note 24, at 458.
42 AON HEWITT, supra note 32, at 44 ("Virtually any targeted reward can be framed as
either a penalty or an incentive.").
2012-20131
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chronic illnesses.43 One activity of particular interest is getting employees
with chronic illnesses to "comply"' with their doctors' recommendations-
in particular, taking their medications as prescribed.45 Medication
noncompliance can cause patients with chronic diseases to experience acute
complications that can be immensely expensive to treat. For example, some
evidence suggests mortality rates for noncompliant patients with heart
disease and diabetes are nearly double the rates for compliant patients.'
By one estimate, the cumulative annual cost of medication noncompliance
in the United States is $290 billion, or approximately thirteen percent of
total health care expenditures.
47
Yet despite the dangers of noncompliance, about half of all patients with
chronic illnesses do not take their medications as prescribed. 48 Accordingly,
employers are showing increasing interest in using monetary incentives to
motivate employees with chronic illnesses to better manage their diseases.
Aon Hewitt's survey revealed that the number of employers tying monetary
incentives to participation in disease management programs roughly tripled
from 2010 to 2011, rising from seventeen to fifty-four percent in a single
year.49 A 2009 survey found that thirteen percent of employers-more
than one in eight-went further, tying incentives directly to employees'
medication compliance. 0
43 Id. at 42.
44 Lars Sandman et al., Adherence, Shared Decision-Making and Patient Autonomy,
15 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 115, 115 (2012), http://www.springerlink.com/content/
p42041o823746 627/ (defining "compliance" as "the extent to which a person's behaviour...
coincides with medical or health advice").
45 CHUCK REYNOLDS & DANA MARTIN, NAT'L PHARM. COUNCIL, EMPLOYER MEDICATION
COMPLIANCE INITIATIVES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I (2009), http://www.npcnow.org/App-Themes/
Public/pdf/Issues/pub-health.prod/CompliSurveyCoverWeb-oi-i9-io.pdf (finding that
eighty-nine percent of surveyed employers rated medication compliance as a top health man-
agement priority).
46 P. Michael Ho et al., Adherence to Cardioprotective Medications and Mortality Among
Patients with Diabetes and Ischemic Heart Disease, 6 BMC CARDIOVASCULAR DISORDERS 48, Dec.
15, 2oo6, at 4. But cf, The Coronary Drug Project Research Group, Influence of Adherence to
Treatment and Response of Cholesterol on Mortality in the Coronary Drug Project, 303 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1038, 1039 (198o) (finding that compliance with placebo lowered mortality risks associ-
ated with coronary artery disease as much as compliance with lipid-influencing treatments).
47 NEW ENGLAND HEALTH INST., THINKING OUTSIDE THE PILLBOX: A SYSTEM-WIDE
APPROACH TO IMPROVING PATIENT MEDICATION ADHERENCE FOR CHRONIC DISEASE (2009),
http://www.nehi.net/publications/44/thinking-outside-the-pillbox-a-systemwide-ap-
proach-to-improving-patient-medication-adherence forchronic..disease. While NEHI's
estimate is widely cited in the press, there is some reason for skepticism. It should be noted
that several of NEHI's members are pharmaceutical companies for whom increasing patient
compliance, and thereby boosting drug sales, is a top priority.
48 SABATt, supra note 26, at 7.
49 AON HEWITT, supra note 32, at 42 (graphing monetary incentive trends).
50 REYNOLDS & MARTIN, supra note 45, at 4. For examples of programs that tie incentives
to medication compliance, see infra Part II.B.2.
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Wellness advocates contend these programs support the value of
fairness, arguing that it is unfair to allow people who make poor health
decisions to increase insurance costs for others who have made more
responsible choices. One prominent advocate of this view, Safeway CEO
Steven Burd,5' has analogized health care coverage to car insurance, noting
that auto insurance companies charge higher premiums for drivers who
have frequent accidents or speeding tickets.5" Mr. Burd argues fairness
similarly requires levying higher health insurance contributions on
employees who make poor health choices, in order to avoid penalizing their
more responsible peers.53
Wellness proponents also claim that using incentives to encourage
healthful behaviors promotes responsible stewardship of scarce healthcare
resources and benefits employees by improving their health. Treating
illnesses that could have been prevented through behavioral changes-at
substantially lower cost-wastes precious resources.- When preventable
illnesses drive up the cost of insuring a pool of employees, employees
may face increased health care costs and employers may reduce salaries
and employ fewer workers.5 5 Reducing the costs of insuring employees by
improving their health, rather than by cutting services, is a laudable goal. 6
51 During the 2oo health care reform debate, Safeway CEO Steven Burd advanced the
fairness argument so successfully in his Congressional testimony that the resulting wellness
provisions in the Affordable Care Act are often referred to as the "Safeway amendment."
David S. Hilzenrath, A Success Story That Isn't Shapes Health-Care Debate; Blood Tests and Weigh-
Ins: Misleading Claims Drive 'Safeway Amendment', WAsH. POST, Jan. 17, zoI o, at G i.
52 Steven A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J, June 12, 2009,
atAI 5 .
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Madison et al., supra note 24, at 455 (citing studies indicating adult smokers
incur $1623 more in medical spending per year than non-smokers, and the medical costs of
obese working-age individuals are more than thirty-five percent higher than their non-obese
counterparts).
55 See, e.g., Baicker & Chandra, supra note 9; Sood et al., supra note 1o, at 145o; Reed
Abelson, Survey: Employers Pass on More Health Costs to Workers, N.Y TIMES BLo (Sept. z,
2010, 11:ooAM), http://prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.Com/2o010/9/02/survey-employers-pass-
on-more-health-costs-to-workers/.
56 However, to date there is little evidence demonstrating that the use of incentives does
change employees' behavior or improve their health. See, e.g., Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning
Employee Health Incentives-Lessons from Behavioral Economics, 365 N w ENG. J. M o. 388, 388
(2oi ). The authors state that
[allthough it may seem obvious that charging higher premiums for smoking(or high body-mass index, cholesterol, or blood pressure) would encourage
people to modify their habits to lower their premiums, evidence that differential
premiums change health-related behavior is scant. Indeed, we're unaware of any
health insurance data that have convincingly demonstrated such effects.
Id. Moreover, there are other possible ways of reducing costs without compromising health,
including improving the efficiency of the health care system and the quality of medical care.
2012-2013]
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II. CONCERNS
While the enthusiasm for wellness strategies is understandable,
these programs also carry costs, many of which are difficult to measure.
As described below, incentive-based wellness programs can undermine
longstanding protections designed to promote ethical allocation and
delivery of health care services.
A. Discrimination Against Sick and Disabled People
The concern that has received the most attention is the potential for
these programs to discriminate against sick or disabled people.57 The
principle of personal responsibility that underlies the fairness argument
is in tension with the value of social solidarity, which "embodies goals of
mutual aid and support." 8 Social solidarity animates legislation such as
the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability; 9 HIPAA provisions that bar group health plans from
discriminating against people on the basis of their health status;' and
provisions in the ACA that bar insurers from discriminating on the basis of
preexisting conditions.6'
Given the central importance of health in people's lives, many people
recognize a societal obligation to ensure access to adequate health care,
regardless of individuals' ability to pay.6" Making health care accessible
-to every American was a major goal of the 2010 health care reform effort
that produced the Affordable Care Act.63 To the extent wellness programs
57 See, e.g., Jesson, supra note 38, at 300-oi; Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will
Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125 (2011);
Thomas J. Parisi, The Onus Is on You: Wellness. Plans and Other Strategies Being Employed for
Patients to Take Ownership of Their Health, 13 QUINNIPIAc HEALTH L.J. 243, 263 (zolO); Jennifer
Dianne Thomas, Mandatory Wellness Programs: A Plan to Reduce Health Care Costs ora Subterfuge
to Discriminate Against Overweight Employees?. 53 How. L. J. 513,513-15 (20o); Harald Schmidt
et al., Carrots, Sticks, and Health Care Reform-Problems with Wellness Initiatives, 362 NEw ENG. J.
MED., at e3(I) (Jan. 14, 20io), http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/io. o56/NEJMpo9l 1552.
58 Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in Health Reform, 14
CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 205 (2oo8).
59 Americans with Disabilities Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Mariner, supra note 58, at 2o6.
60 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2oo6); Mariner, supra note 58, at 2o6. H IPAA's wellness provisions are
an exception to the general rule against this kind of discrimination. See infra Part IV.A.
61 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 1I1-148, § 1101, 124 Stat.
119 (2oo) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001) (entitled "Immediate Access to Insurance for
Uninsured Individuals with a Preexisting Condition").
62 Mariner, supra note 58, at 202. See generally NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE
(1985).
63 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Lays Out His Health
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 201o, at Ai.
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increase health insurance costs for sick employees, they work against this
objective. 64
It is easy to see how tying incentives to employees' health behaviors or
particular health outcomes could discriminate against sick employees. For
example, an employer could offer two types of insurance: a standard plan
with high employee contributions and basic benefits and an "enhanced"
plan with low contributions and more generous benefits. Every employee
would default to the standard plan but could qualify for the enhanced plan
by achieving certain blood pressure and cholesterol levels. Since some
employees suffering from chronic illnesses may not be able to meet these
goals under any conditions-and, indeed, it may be dangerous for them to
attempt to do so-this arrangement would discriminate against sick people
by charging them higher insurance rates. Moreover, this arrangement
could produce backdoor employment discrimination by dissuading people
with chronic illnesses from seeking work at this company, particularly
if the "standard" health plan were not affordable. 65 As described below,
Congress has enacted a set of legal protections to guard against this kind of
discrimination. 66
B. Patient Autonomy
While the potential for wellness programs to discriminate has been
widely recognized in the literature and in the laws governing group health
insurance,67 these programs also raise a different kind of concern that has
received scant consideration: a threat to patient autonomy. Unlike concerns
about discrimination, which stress the unfairness of punishing people who
cannot achieve certain health outcomes no matter how hard they try,
65
autonomy concerns emphasize protecting individuals' ability to make their
own choices about their bodies and medical care.
1. MedicalEthics Require Voluntary Consent to Treatment.-Respect for patient
autonomy is a core principle of modern medical ethics.69 It underlies the
64 Volpp et al., supra note 56, at 389 ("[elnabling employers to vary premiums on the ba-
sis of employees' health-related behaviors or health outcomes could undermine some of the
ACA's intended benefits," including "spread[ing] the costs of addressing health risks across
the population and .. . discourag[ing] insurers from trying to enroll only the healthiest (and
lowest-cost) individuals").
65 See Madison et al., supra note 24, at 456.
66 See infra Part IV.A.
67 See supra note 57 and infra Part IVA, respectively.
68 Volpp et al.,supra note 56, at 389 (noting that under a pure "personal accountability"
model "many people would end up paying higher premiums for behaviors and outcomes that
may not be completely under their control").
69 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES E CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
99 (6th ed. 2oo9); NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
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legal and ethical requirement that, with very limited exceptions, medical
treatment may not be administered to competent individuals without
their informed consent.7" Informed consent protects the right to self-
determination by ensuring that patients understand the risks and benefits
of medical interventions and voluntarily consent to them or refuse them.7
Voluntariness requires that a patient's consent to a course of treatment
is freely chosen rather than the product of controlling influences exerted by
others.72 While a patient's decision regarding a medical intervention may
be influenced by many external factors, including reasoned persuasion
about the treatment's benefits, the patient remains autonomous as long
as he or she "freely accept[s]-as his or her own-the beliefs, attitudes,
values, intentions, or actions advocated by the persuader."73
However, an individual's voluntary consent is undermined to the extent
her decision is substantially controlled by influences exerted by others. In
the extreme case, a patient can be coerced into "consenting" to a treatment
if another party presents "a credible threat of unwanted and avoidable
harm so severe that the person is unable to resist acting to avoid it."74 "Your
money or your life" is an example of an influence that would fully control an
individual's decision because the influence cannot reasonably be resisted.
Other forms of influence that do not reach the level of coercion can
still undermine patients' autonomy. In their seminal treatise on informed
consent, Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp argue that an influence impairs
voluntariness to the extent an individual finds the influence difficult to
resist.75 In this view it is not only threats of harm that can undermine
voluntariness but also offers of rewards that an individual finds unwelcome
but difficult to decline. Thus, in the context of conducting research on
human subjects, the Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences admonishes that "[playments in money or in kind to research
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 4 (1979), available at http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/o5/briefing/oo5-4178b0902 Belmont%zoReport.pdf [hereinafter THE
BELMONT REPORT].
70 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), Cardozo, J. ("Every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits
an assault, for which he is liable in damages."); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 69, at 118
("the primary justification advanced for requirements of informed consent has been to protect
autonomous choice.").
71 See, e.g., THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 69, at 4.
72 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 2, at 256.
73 Id. at 261-62.
74 Id. at 339.
75 Id. at 256-58. However, as discussed infra Part II.B.3, others argue that an individual's
subjective ability to resist an influence is not an appropriate standard for assessing
voluntariness.
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subjects should not be so large as to persuade them to take undue risks
or volunteer against their better judgment," noting that "[playments
or rewards that undermine a person's capacity to exercise free choice
invalidate consent." 76
To illustrate the potential for unwelcome offers to undermine
autonomy, Faden and Beauchamp offer the example of Mary, a financially
desperate woman. Researchers offer Mary $25 per day in exchange for her
participation in research involving repeated, "painful and invasive medical
procedures.""71 Mary is terrified of participating in the research, but badly
needs money. "Mary wishes desperately that she had never received
such an offer because once it is made, she feels she must accept, whereas
beforehand she would never have been faced with such a tragic 'choice.'
' 78
In Faden and Beauchamp's view, Mary's consent is no longer substantially
under her control; her desperation and the researcher's offer place her
substantially under the researcher's control. 9
Thus, while it is important to protect the right of patients to make their
own choices regarding medical interventions, many ethicists argue there
are some choices people should not have to make. This seems to be the
view motivating laws restricting the sale of human organs 0 and regulations
governing the treatment of participants in medical research. 81 From a
libertarian perspective, if a person values a certain amount of money
more than he values his kidney,.he should be free to sell it. Similarly, a
laissez-faire approach to medical research would allow researchers to
recruit participants for extremely risky experiments by offering very large
incentives to people who badly need the money, just as employers may offer
large salaries in exchange for dangerous work. When it comes to medical
interventions, however, many are troubled by the prospect of treating
decisions about one's body like other market transactions.8" Accordingly,
76 COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS OF MED. SCIS, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES OF
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 46 (2002), Guideline 7, available at http://
www.cioms.ch/publications/layout-guide2oo2.pdf. Note, however, that there are important
differences between the research and clinical contexts, some of which are discussed infra
Part II.B.3.
77 FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, note 2, at 358.
78 Id. at 358-59.
79 Id. at 359. However, as described infra Part II.B.3, this view is not universally accepted.
8o National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (0984) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 273-274 (2006)).
81 See 45 C.F.R. §46 subpart A (201 1).
8z See, e.g., Cynthia B. Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: The Gift of
the Magi Revisited, 24 J. MED. PHILOS. 288, 292 (1999) ("Human beings... are of incomparable
ethical worth and admit of no equivalent. Each has value that is beyond the contingencies of
supply and demand or of any other relative estimation. They are priceless. Consequently, to
sell an integral human body part is to corrupt the very meaning of human dignity."); Margaret
Jane Radin, Market-Inalienabiity, 1oo HAav. L. REV. 1849, 1881 (1987) ("We feel discomfort or
even insult, and we fear degradation or even loss of the value involved when bodily integrity
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the federal government has enacted rules that limit the use of incentives to
motivate people to undergo medical interventions.
Whether a wellness program undermines patient autonomy depends
in large part on the extent to which the program threatens employees
with serious harm for failing to comply or otherwise unduly influences
employees to comply. As described in the next section, the use of financial
incentives in wellness programs raises the prospect that employers can
make penalties for noncompliance so large that many employees have little
choice but to undergo prescribed treatments.
2. How Wellness Programs Can Threaten Voluntary Consent.-There is nothing
inherently wrong with using incentives to influence behavior. Indeed the
essence of a market economy is to offer incentives for others to provide
us goods and services they otherwise would not provide. Moreover, the
behaviors promoted by wellness programs seem benign. They tend
to involve doctors' standard litany of eating less, exercising more, and
quitting smoking-things we tend to think everyone wants to do, but often
need some motivational help to achieve. But in the context of medical
interventions, pressuring employees to undertake certain behaviors can
conflict with the ethical requirement that patients voluntarily consent to
treatment.
One reason the implications of wellness programs for patient autonomy
have gone largely unnoticed may be because many common wellness
interventions-like requirements to quit smoking or exercise more-do
not sound like the kinds of medical treatments with which we typically
associate the requirement of informed consent. But wellness program
incentives can also extend to patients' decisions regarding whether to take
prescribed medications-a paradigmatic example of the kind of medical
decisions that require patients' voluntary consent.
While many people struggle to take their medications as prescribed,
other noncompliant patients do not take their drugs because they do not
want to. According to one study, about one third of noncompliant patients
refuse to take their medications because they do not believe they need
the drugs or do not like their side effects. 3 Other reasons patients cite
for refusing to take their medications include feeling that "the medication
interfered with their personal priorities [or] social life" or that the drugs
made them "perceive themselves negatively."" The purpose of tying
is conceived of as a fungible object.").
83 Bos. CONSULTING GRP., THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC: FINDING A CURE FOR UNFILLED
PRESCRIPrIONS AND MISSED DOSES I (2003), http://www.bcg.com/documents/fileI4z65.pdf.
84 Charlotte Huff, Employers Bolster Medication Adherence Initiatives, WORKFORCE (July 20,
201o), http://www.workforce.com/article/2o0072o/NEWSo2/3o72o9995/employers-bolster-
medication-adherence-initiatives.
[Vol. 1I
THE EROSION OF INFORMED CONSENT
incentives to medication compliance is to pressure these people, who do
not want to take the drugs prescribed by their doctors, to take them anyway.
The extent to which that pressure undermines patients' informed
consent depends in large part on the size of the "incentives" at issue. A
$25 gift card at Starbucks seems fine, but it also seems unlikely to motivate
employees to change their health behaviors in any meaningful way.85
Accordingly, employers are showing an increasing appetite for using larger
incentives that make access to lower-cost health insurance contingent
on employees' compliance with particular requirements.86 Aon Hewitt's
chief medical officer, Dr. Paul Berger, explains that increasingly employers
are saying, "We want you to take some responsibility, and if you don't
do certain things we want you to do, you'll only be eligible for the bad
[health insurance] plan with a $3,000 deductible as opposed to the $1,000
deductible.... That gets your attention."87
Blue Care Network of Michigan has taken this approach in offering
employers a group health plan called "Healthy Blue Living."88 Every
insured employee starts out in a plan with "enhanced" (i.e., more generous)
benefits and lower copayments and deductibles.89 To continue to receive
the enhanced benefits and lower payments beyond the first ninety days
of coverage, employees and their spouses must follow their primary care
physicians' treatment plans.' Blue Care Network monitors the compliance
of employees and their spouses by requiring their physicians to complete
a questionnaire affirming that the patients are following the doctor's plan.9"
If an employee's physician will not confirm her compliance with the
85 Stephen Miller, Wellness Programs Get a Boost in Health Care Reform Law, Soc'v FOR
HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Mar. 25, 20o), http://www.shrm.org/Publications/HRNews/Pages/
WellnessReformBoast.aspx (quoting Thorn Mangan, CEO of health insurance consultancy
Corporate Synergies, arguing that "[t/he effectiveness of financial incentives is closely tied to
the amount you provide").
86 See Joseph Marlowe et al., Complex Chronic Illness: An Essential Taget in Health Cost
Management, WORLDATWORK J., Third Quarter 2oo9 at 47, 51-52, available at http://www.
aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments/human-capital-consulting/Client-
SymposiumChroniclllness-z.pdf. The authors note:
Aon Consulting has advised several clients on a new approach to incentives that is
predicated on the proposition that a comprehensive, low-cost health plan should
not be viewed by employees as an entitlement. Rather, employees would earn the
right to enroll in a health plan with lower contributions by completing a health
risk assessment, enrolling in health-behavior change programs where needed and
participating in condition management to address chronic illness. The lower-value
plan forced on those who are not compliant with the wellness message might have
higher contributions, a large deductible and/or may lack coverage for certain ser-
vices.
Id.
87 Knowles, supra note 37.
88 See BLUE CAnE NETWORK OF MICH., supra note 6.
89 Id. at I.
90 Id. at 2-3.
91 Id. at 3.
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treatment plan, the employee must pay higher insurance contributions and
will lose certain benefits.
A company called BeniComp Advantage sells a plan that similarly
ties employees' health insurance contributions to their compliance with
wellness program requirements, including medication compliance. 9 The
first step in the Advantage plan is to raise all employees' deductibles,
thereby shifting a greater share of total insurance costs from the employer
to the employees.93 Employees can reduce their costs by either meeting
certain health targets (such as "body mass index limits, controlled blood
pressure, cholesterol and non-tobacco use") or by "following the treatment
regime prescribed for their condition." 94 BeniComp explains that
employers can expect to achieve savings from this program in three ways:
first, by raising employees' deductibles; second, by promoting healthier
employees; and third, by motivating some employees to "choose other
health care options."'95 While the meaning of this last item is not entirely
clear, it appears to suggest employers can save money when employees
who cannot afford the increased insurance contributions, and who cannot
reduce the cost of their insurance by meeting specified health targets, drop
their coverage. 96
If wellness incentives become so large that employees' access to
affordable insurance hinges on their compliance with wellness program
requirements, it is reasonable to ask whether these employees' consent is
voluntary. The prospect of losing access to health insurance poses a threat
of serious harm to employees. The Institute of Medicine has concluded
that "working-age Americans (those between 18 and 65) who do not have
health insurance have poorer health and die prematurely."97 The Institute's
report estimates that in the year 2000, "18,000 excess deaths among
adults between ages 25 and 64 could be attributed to lack of coverage"-
comparable to the number of deaths annually associated with diabetes
and stroke.98 Uninsured infants are more likely to die prematurely, to have
poorer health outcomes, and to be at risk of developmental problems. 99
People who lack insurance face dangers not only to their health but to
92 Employer FAQs, BENICOMP ADVANTAGE, http://www.benicompadvantage.com/index.
php?option=com-content&view=article&id= 16&Itemid=zo (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id. Note that this plan design could produce savings for employers without improving
employee health at all-i.e., through increased employee contributions and the departure of
employees who cannot afford higher deductibles.
96 Schmidt et al., supra note 57.
97 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcAts., INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 44 (2OO4), available at http://iom.edu/ReportS/2oo4/Insuring-Americas-
Health-Principles-and-Recommendations.aspx.
98 Id. at 46.
99 Id. at 45.
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their finances. A single hospitalization can saddle an uninsured family
with insurmountable debt, even if the family's income is well above the
Federal Poverty Level. l°° "Even one uninsured person in a family can put
the financial stability and health of the whole family at risk."'10 Given the
critical role of health insurance in ensuring the wellbeing of one's family,
the possibility of losing coverage can constitute a threat of harm so severe
that it leaves employees little choice but to accept wellness program
requirements. 0
3. Counterarguments to the Voluntariness Critique.-To date, there has been
very little consideration of how wellness programs can threaten patient
autonomy. The limited literature that has acknowledged this concern fails
to accurately characterize the nature of this threat and is not grounded
in thoughtful consideration of the kinds of harms that could result. For
example, in an ethical analysis of incentive programs offered by Steven
Pearson and Sarah Lieber, the authors acknowledge that "[p]enalties for
medication adherence conflict with competent patients' general right to
decline any treatment, and therefore they must be framed cautiously and
narrowly."'0 3 However, the authors argue such penalties are justified as
long as the treatment is "prescribed by an independent physician who has
judged, in discussion with the employee, that the medication is likely to
confer a positive net health benefit on the employee."'" "If this condition
can be met," the authors conclude, "then it is reasonable to consider
adherence to the prescription as a voluntary action for which an employee
can be held responsible."'' 0
This argument appears untethered to any recognizable concept of
voluntary consent. The fundamental idea underlying the requirement
of voluntariness-which is a manifestation of the principle of respect for
personsl° 6 -is that decisions about whether to follow a course of treatment
are for individuals to make in accordance with their own values.0 7
10O See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Svcs., THE VALUE OF HEALTH INSURANCE: FEW
OF THE UNINSURED HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCES TO PAY POTENTIAL HOSPITAL BILLS (201 1),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2oi i/valueofinsurance/rb.pdf.
I01 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcADs., supra note 97, at 2.
102 See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 2, at 339 (defining coercion as "a credible threat
of unwanted and avoidable harm so severe that the person is unable to resist acting to avoid
it"); see also Madison et al., supra note 24, at 459 (defining coercion as "intentional use of a
credible and severe threat of harm or force to control another or to compel him or her to do
something").
103 Steven D. Pearson & Sarah R. Lieber, Financial Penalties For The Unhealthy? Ethical
Guidelines for Holding Employees Responsible for Their Health, z8 HEALTH AFF. 845, 849 (2009).
104 Id.
105 Id.
Io6 THE B ELMONT REPORT, supra note 67, at 4.
107 See, e.g., FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 2, at 8 ("To respect an autonomous agent is
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Voluntariness simply cannot mean the right to decline a treatment unless a
doctor thinks the patient would benefit from it.
However there are other, more plausible objections to the claim that
wellness programs threaten voluntariness. For example, one might argue
that, at least in the context of treatment compliance, we need not worry
about voluntariness because doctors would shield their patients from
unwanted treatments by conforming their prescriptions to patients'
preferences. More broadly, authors Madison, Volpp, and Halpern contend
that since employees are not entitled to health insurance in the first
place, they cannot be harmed by any conditions employers may attach to
the provision of insurance. 0 8 Because wellness programs do not threaten
noncompliant employees with a cognizable harm, the authors argue, these
programs cannot be considered coercive. These authors also argue that
because the purpose of wellness incentives is to get patients to make
choices that are in their own best interests, no amount of incentives could
be deemed to constitute an "undue influence" on employees' consent. On
inspection, however, these arguments fail to allay concerns about patient
autonomy.
a. Will Doctors Act as Buffers?
In the context of using incentives to compel patients to take their
prescribed medications, one might object that in practice physicians would
protect patients by conforming their treatment recommendations to their
patients' preferences. Typically treatment plans are produced through
a process of negotiation between patients and their physicians.)° Those
plans are renegotiated in light of subsequent events, including changes in
the patient's health status and difficulties patients may experience with the
initial course of treatment."10 It seems reasonable to assume that, in general,
doctors want to assist their patients in promoting their health, not to force
them to use unwanted treatments.
However, the assumption that doctors will follow patients' wishes in
setting treatment plans is not as safe as it first appears. Doctors and patients
may disagree about the kinds of side effects that are worth tolerating in
order to achieve a particular health goal, or how to deal with those side
effects-e.g., by discontinuing the drug or "managing" the side effects with
other drugs. Patient noncompliance is a significant source of frustration for
to recognize with due appreciation that person's capacities and perspective, including his or
her right to hold certain views, to make certain choices, and to take certain actions based on
personal values and beliefs.").
io8 See Madison et al., supra note 24, at 459-61.
109 Gene Bishop & Amy C. Brodkey, Personal Responsibility and Physician Responsibility -
West Virginia's Medicaid Plan, 355 NEw ENC. J. MED. 756, 757 (2oo6).
ito See id.
[Vol. IOI
THE EROSION OF INFORMED CONSENT
doctors."' Many doctors' current deference to patients may be a function
of the fact that there is little they can do to motivate patients to comply.
These doctors may welcome the additional leverage incentive programs
can provide in getting patients to follow their advice."'
Moreover, doctors can have secondary interests that may conflict with
their interest in respecting patient autonomy. Some doctors have financial
incentives to resist letting patients make their own treatment decisions.
For example, doctors who operate their own pharmacies can earn tens
of thousands of dollars a year from filling the prescriptions they write for
patients, creating a direct relationship between patient compliance and
physician profits." 3 In addition, patients are not the only stakeholders
in the health care system whose behavior payers are seeking to modify
with incentives. Increasingly health plans and hospitals are using "pay-
for-performance" systems that reward or penalize doctors based on their
adherence to certain medical best practices. Some of these systems work
by creating treatment rules for various conditions, and then financially
rewarding or penalizing doctors based on the extent to which they adhere
to those care rules." 4 Thus, if the "best practice" for treating type 2 diabetes
calls for keeping patients' blood glucose levels below seven percent,
physicians in this type of system would have an incentive to aggressively
treat diabetic patients to maintain those levels, regardless of whether that
treatment conflicts with the patient's priorities' 5 or even if it is not in the
patient's best medical interests." 6 A patient who experiences unpleasant
III See, e.g., What Doctors Wish Their Patients Knew, CONSUMER REPS. (Feb. 2011),
http://www.consumerreports.org/health/doctors-hospitals/doctors/physician-survey/index.
htm (reporting survey results showing that "[nioncompliance with advice or treatment
recommendations was the top complaint doctors had about their patients").
112 See, e.g., Cynthia S. Rand & Mary Ann Sevick, Ethics in Adherence Promotion and
Monitoring, 21 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS S241, S243 (zooo) ("Clinicians who believe that
adherence with therapy is in the patient's best interest may violate a patient's autonomy by
pressing, coercing, or in some subtle or explicit manner forcing adherence.").
113 Barry Meier & Katie Thomas, Insurers Pay 1ig Markups as Doctors Dispense Drugs, N.Y
TIMES, July 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2o12/07/1 2/business/some-physicians-mak-
ing-millions-selling-d rugs.html.
114 Michael F Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good Candidate?, 7 YALE J.
HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETICS 1, 3 (2007); Symmetry EBM Connect Product Sheet, INGENIX I, I
(2OO9), http://www.optuminsight.com/-/media/Ingenix/Resources/Downloads/Product%20
Sheets/SymmetryEBMConnectproductsheet.pdf.
115 Lois Snyder & Richard L. Neubauer, Pay-for-Performance Principles That Promote
Patient-Centered Care. An Ethics Manifesto, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 792, 793 (2007) ("Pay-
for-performance and other programs that create strong incentives for high-quality care set up
a potential conflict between this duty [to care for patients] and the competing interest of try-
ing to comply with a performance measure-whether the measure is a priority for that patient
or not"); Cannon, supra note 114, at 13 (under certain pay-for-performance systems that tie
payments to following clinical guidelines, "a provider would be penalized for treating patients
according to their preferences").
116 Cannon, supra note 114 at io ("[pay for performance] schemes that encourage pro-
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side effects from this course of treatment, who has different treatment
goals, or who otherwise believes the risks of this approach outweigh its
benefits, might ask his doctor to modify his treatment plan. A doctor in a
pay-for-performance system may have a substantial incentive to deny that
request, since departing from the best practice may incur a penalty.117 In
sum, patients in wellness programs that tie incentives to compliance with
doctors' recommendations may not be able to rely on their doctors to defer
to their wishes regarding treatment.
In most cases, however, if a patient complains of unpleasant, let alone
dangerous, side effects, presumably most doctors would be willing to
change the patient's treatment plan. Nevertheless, there remains something
deeply troubling about effectively requiring patients to seek their doctors'
permission to discontinue use of a drug. This scenario turns the concept of
informed consent on its head. Rather than respect patients as autonomous
agents entitled to make medical choices on the basis of their own values,
this arrangement insults patients' dignity in precisely the way that the
requirement of voluntariness is intended to prevent.
b. Can Financial Incentives Be Coercive?
Madison, Volpp, and Halpern contend incentive programs should not
be deemed coercive because tying employees' insurance contributions to
their health behaviors would not "worsen the situation or violate the rights
of individuals who are unable to engage in healthy behaviors.""I8 In support
of this argument, the authors examine hypothetical incentive programs in
which smokers face up to a $100 penalty for failing to quit." 9 They argue
that although smokers may pay more for insurance in these scenarios,
the programs cannot be considered coercive for two reasons. First, the
imposition of an annual $100 surcharge on smokers does not constitute
a threat of harm so severe that it leaves smokers with no reasonable
alternative but to comply.' Second, the authors argue that even if smokers
end up paying more for insurance, they cannot have been "harmed"
because employees are not entitled to health insurance in the first place.'
viders to treat outliers like the average patient can ... create perverse incentives that encour-
age low-quality care"); Daniel G. Larriviere & James L. Bernat, Threats to physician autonomy in
aperformance-based reimbursement system, 70 NEUROLOGY 2338, 2339 (2oo8) ("physicians across
all specialties share a concern that a system created to make medical decisions more rational
will become ... one which places a premium on rigid adherence to guidelines at the expense
of individual physician judgment and patient preferences.").
117 See Cannon, supra note 114, at io; Larriviere & Bernat, supra note II6, at 2341;
Snyder & Neubauer, supra note 115, at 793.
118 Madison et al., supra note 24, at 459-
i19 Id. at 459-61.
I2o Id. at 460.
121 Id.
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Since an employer that implements this kind of program has not violated
any employee right to health insurance, the employees cannot be made
worse off by any conditions an employer may attach to the provision of
insurance. '2 Neither of these arguments is convincing.
First, while the authors' hypothetical $100 annual surcharge may not
be a sufficient threat of harm to constitute coercion, employers can and do
charge considerably more. Consider the wellness program implemented
by Valeo, an auto parts supplier with more than 73,000 employees.123 The
company began by increasing the deductibles in its employee health plan
dramatically-from $200 for individual coverage to $2,200, and from $400
for family coverage to $4,400.124 Valeo's employees could reduce their
deductibles to the prior, lower amounts by ceasing to smoke and meeting
the company's goals for cholesterol, blood pressure, and body mass."2 5
Unlike a $100 charge, these increased deductibles are so large that some
employees may not be able to afford them, leaving them with a choice
between complying with the wellness program requirements or losing
health insurance.
Madison et al. appear to argue that even this scenario cannot be
deemed coercive because employees are not entitled to health insurance
on any particular terms. In this view, because employer-subsidized health
insurance is a privilege, any increase in the employee's cost for that
privilege cannot be considered a "harm," but is more properly considered
a smaller benefit. This argument is based on a "rights-violating" definition
of coercion, under which A can only be said to coerce B if "A proposes or
threatens to violate B's rights or not fulfill an obligation" unless B complies,
and if "B has no reasonable alternative but to accept A's proposal."'21 6 For
example, a prosecutor who offers a criminal defendant a lenient sentence if
he pleads guilty does not "coerce" the defendant to accept by threatening
to take the case to trial if he refuses the plea agreement."2 7 Since the
defendant has no right either to avoid trial or to obtain a lenient sentence,
the defendant is not harmed by the prosecutor's offer even if he has no
122 Id.
123 Hilzenrath, supra note 3. As of the writing of this article, Valeo claims to employ ap-
proximately 73,800 people worldwide. Globalpresence, VALEO, http://www.valeo.com/en/home/
the-group/global-presence.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
124 Id.
125 Id. Valeo's human resources director acknowledged that the ostensible "rewards" the
company offers for meeting wellness targets are in fact penalties imposed on noncompliant
employees, stating "[i]f they don't comply, they end up being penalized, if you will, but we
refer to it as a Healthy Rewards program."
126 Madison et al., supra note 24, at 459 (quoting Alan Wertheimer & Frank G. Miller,
Payment for Research Participation: A Coercive Offer?, 34 1 M ED. ETHICS 389, 390 (2oo8)).
127 Alan Wertheimer & Frank G. Miller, Payment for Research Participation: A Coertive
Offer?, 34 . MED. ETHICS 389, 390 (2008).
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reasonable alternative but to accept.""8 By contrast, if a doctor is obligated
to treat patients free of charge (e.g., in a single-payer health system), the
doctor may coerce a patient by refusing to provide important health services
unless the patient pays a fee. 1 9 Because the patient is legally entitled to
receive free medical services and the doctor is obligated to provide them,
the doctor's actions may be considered coercive. 31
Drawing on this rights-violating framework, Madison et al. note that
"[hlistorically ... employers have not been obligated to offer insurance,
and moreover ... they are expressly permitted to offer wellness programs
that include incentives."'' Since "[e]mployers do not as a general
matter threaten employee rights by setting premiums based on health
behaviors,"'' 31 the authors argue they cannot harm employees by penalizing
noncompliance.
The problem with applying this "rights-violating" framework to
incentive programs is that it begs the question of what rights employees ought
to have with respect to the terms of their health insurance. For example,
despite the fact that employers are not obligated to offer health insurance,
employers who choose to do so are barred from discriminating against
disabled people by charging them higher rates.' 33 The law has created a
set of rights according to which people are entitled not to be discriminated
against on the basis of disability. Congress could similarly pass legislation
requiring that when employers make health insurance available, they may
not condition employees' insurance contributions on their compliance
with wellness program dictates. If Congress passed that kind of law, then
incentive programs could indeed be considered coercive under the rights-
violating view. Thus, if our inquiry is not what the law currently allows,
but what the law should allow, the rights-based analysis simply is not
helpful. 3 4 Instead, we must grapple with how to weigh competing values
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Madison et al., supra note 24, at 460.
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)
(2012).
134 Indeed, Madison et al. seem inclined to create some rights for employees that would
render certain incentives coercive under the rights-violating framework. They argue, for ex-
ample, that "firms should not require employees to participate in [wellness programs] as a
condition of employment." Madison et al., supra note 24, at 458. But just as employers are
under no obligation to offer employees health insurance, they also are not obligated to offer
employment to any particular individual. Since employees generally are not entitled to their
jobs, it is not clear how they can be "harmed," in the view of Madison et al., by an employer
requiring compliance as a term of employment. If this constitutes a cognizable harm, it is dif-
ficult to understand why the choice between compliance or unemployment should be consid-
ered coercive, while the choice between compliance and losing health insurance should not.
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of fairness, responsible stewardship, and individual autonomy, informed by
a thoughtful and thorough assessment of not only the economic benefits of
incentive programs but the personal costs to individuals.
c. Can Financial Incentives Unduly Induce Employees to Place
Themselves at Risk?
Coercion is not the only way voluntariness can be undermined.
Ethicists have also recognized that some offers may be so attractive
that they undermine individuals' ability to act as autonomous agents,
which is often characterized as a concern about "undue inducement.', 35
Traditionally, bioethicists have defined undue inducement by reference to
an individual's subjective perception of a reward or penalty-specifically,
how easily the person can resist the offer. 136 In this view, even if an incentive
program that imposed substantial penalties for noncompliance were not
"coercive," it could be ethically objectionable on the grounds that it would
unduly influence employees' decision-making regarding health decisions.
To the extent employees found the wellness proposition-the offer of
lower insurance costs, or avoiding higher insurance costs, in exchange for
their compliance-unwelcome but difficult to resist, under the traditional
view their decisions would not be deemed free of substantially controlling
influences.
More recently, however, critics have questioned this view of undue
influence. Most notably, in the context of human subjects research, Ezekiel
Emanuel has argued that concerns about undue inducement must be
grounded not in how difficult an individual finds an offer to resist, but in
an offer's potential to induce people to engage in activities that may harm
them.137 Emanuel argues persuasively that most concerns about undue
inducement are really concerns about the nature of the underlying activity
being induced. He notes, for example, that no one claims that movie stars
and professional athletes are "unduly induced" to perform when they are
offered millions in salary."3 While these individuals may find fame and
fortune difficult to resist, because these activities are ethical, reasonable,
and legal, it does not make sense to say these people have been treated
unethically.'3 9 Rather, Emanuel argues that "[ijnducements prompt ethical
concern when they distort people's judgment, encouraging them to engage
in activities that contravene their interests because they are harmful."'40
135 Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Ending Concerns About Undue Inducement, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
100, 100 (2004).
136 See supra Part II.B.I.
137 Emanuel, supra note 135, at ioo-oI.
138 Id. at 101-02.
139 Id.
140 Id. at I0o.
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He further argues that because medical research on humans is subject to
ethical rules and oversight designed to protect people from risky research,14'
undue inducement cannot be a valid concern in research that otherwise
meets ethical standards. 42
Madison et al. extend this reasoning to wellness incentive programs,
arguing that such programs "are unlikely to constitute undue inducements,
because they promote healthy behaviors .... ,,143 They argue that because
"[tihe risks or drawbacks of participating in wellness programs seem much
less of a concern than risks in human subjects research. . . . a wellness
incentive cannot be deemed an undue inducement, regardless of its
magnitude."' 144
However, Emanuel's reasoning from the human research context
cannot be so easily imported into an analysis of wellness programs.
Although Madison et al. assume that participation in wellness programs
presents "much less" risk than human subjects research, in reality that is far
from clear. Deciding whether to participate in research typically involves
determining whether to accept payment in exchange for assuming minimal
risks over a fixed period of time. This calculus is qualitatively different
from deciding whether to indefinitely comply with certain behavioral
changes and medical interventions in exchange for access to health
insurance. Moreover, wellness programs are not subject to ethics reviews
or the other machinery designed to protect human research subjects from
harm. While wellness programs are supposed to be designed to improve
employee health, from the employer's perspective that improvement is not
the ultimate goal but a means of achieving a different end: saving money.
Within that context there is little reason to assume these programs cannot
subject employees to serious risks.
This is the key problem not only with Madison et al.'s argument,
but with many justifications of incentive programs: the assumption that
wellness programs are ethical because they benefit employees by making
them healthier.' 45 As described in Part III below, even programs that are
designed to promote the health of a pool of employees may not further
141 For example, federal regulations commonly referred to as the "Common Rule" re-
quire all research conducted or funded by the federal government to be approved by institu-
tional review boards ("IRBs"). 45 C.F.R. § 46.1o9(a) (201i). IRBs are responsible for ensuring
that research minimizes risks to participants, and that the risks of such research are reasonable
in relation to anticipated benefits. 45 C.FR. § 46.11 i(a) (201 i).
142 Emanuel, supra note 135, at IOO.
143 Madison et al.,supra note 24, at 461.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Wendy Everett, Thinking Outside the Pillbox - Medication
Adherence as a Priority for Health Care Reform, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1553, 1554 (2010); Scott
D. Halpern et al., Patients as Mercenaries? The Ethics of Using Financial Incentives in the War on
Unhealthy Behaviors, 2 CIRC. CitDIovAsc. QUAL. OUTCOMES 514, 515-16 (2009); Volpp et al.,
supra note 56.
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individual employees' best interests and can actually subject them to risks.
For these individuals, excessive inducements to comply with wellness
program requirements-and to abdicate their prerogative to determine
their own courses of treatment-can cause real harm.
III. THE HARMs OF COMPELLED COMPLIANCE
The key justification for wellness programs is that employees will
benefit, since the purpose of these programs is to reduce costs by promoting
employee health. 14 While the possible systemic, economic benefits of
these programs are clear (though by no means guaranteed), there has been
little consideration of the costs they might impose on individuals. 1 47 The
ethical principle of autonomy is intended to express respect for the right of
competent individuals (i.e., people who have "the ability to make decisions
based on [their] own preferences and beliefs") to conform their choices
about medical interventions to their own values. 14 Tying substantial
penalties to employees' failure to adopt behaviors that reduce costs for
an insurance pool directly harms patients by undermining their right to
self-determination. In addition, while the condition of voluntariness is
important in its own right as a reflection of respect for individual autonomy,
it is also a safeguard for other important values. Preserving patients' rights
to refuse treatment is a bulwark against invasions of patient privacy and
threats to their health.' 49 These potential harms should not be overlooked
simply because they are harder to quantify than the possible economic
gains.
A. Loss of Privacy
Employees in many incentive-based wellness programs must decide
not only whether to comply with particular health requirements, but
also whether to consent to having their behaviors monitored. 5 ' While
146 See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 1 I1-148, § 12oi,
124 Stat. 119, 158 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(B) (2oo6 & Supp. V 2ol I))
(requiring that wellness programs must "be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent
disease").
147 Seesupra text accompanying note 56.
148 Sandman et al., supra note 44, at 19 ("To be decision competent, the person needs
to have some idea about what he or she wants, some ability to contemplate options and what
they would result in, and an ability to judge the value of these results.").
149 See generally BEAUCHAMP & CRLDRESS, supra note 69, at 74 (noting that informed con-
sent not only protects patients' autonomy, but also protects patients against harm and encour-
ages physicians to act responsibly toward patients).
150 Madison et al. acknowledge that these are valid concerns, arguing that "[e]mploy-
ees concerned that sharing health-related information with an employer might violate their
privacy, unacceptably mix their work and personal lives, or subject them to employment dis-
2012-2013]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
surrendering some measure of personal privacy is a necessary part of
receiving health insurance and services, incentive-based wellness
programs can take privacy intrusions to a new level of invasiveness.
Offering incentives in exchange for meeting certain health targets or
undertaking certain behaviors requires program administrators to verify
that employees have met these goals. When incentives are connected to
achieving particular outcomes, verification can take the form of periodic
weight measurement, blood pressure and glucose level tests, and other
tests. While employees may object to this type of episodic monitoring,
these measures pale in comparison to the kinds of monitoring required to
determine whether an employee is adhering to a diet, exercising regularly,
or taking her medications as prescribed.
One approach to monitoring employees' behaviors is to enlist employees'
physicians to verify patients' compliance with their treatment plans. West
Virginia has pioneered this approach in its state Medicaid plan, which
offers a two-tiered insurance plan in which patients can obtain enhanced
benefits15" ' by participating in health care screenings, "adher[ing] to health
improvement programs as directed by their health care providers," and
taking their prescribed medications.15 The plan charges physicians with
monitoring their patients' compliance with their treatment plans and
reporting patients' compliance (or lack thereof) to the state.'53 Some private
health plans have implemented this strategy as well. For example, in the
Healthy Blue Living program, 1 4 employees can only obtain the lower-cost
insurance plan by getting their physicians to complete a questionnaire to
confirm that the employee and her spouse have reached or are continuing
to actively work toward their health goals.'
Using physicians to monitor patients' compliance raises troubling
issues. It intrudes on the doctor-patient relationship and creates conflicts
of interest for doctors, both of which may undermine patients' trust in their
physicians. Obligating doctors to report patients' health behaviors to their
employers' wellness plan administrators can conflict with doctors' ethical
and professional obligation to protect patients' health. A doctor faced with
a noncompliant patient would face a choice between falsely verifying her
crimination, should be able to decline to participate in such programs without risk of being
fired." Madison et a]., supra note 24, at 458.
151 The enhanced plan offers additional access to prescription drugs, diabetes care, and
mental health services that are not provided in the state's standard Medicaid plan. E.g., HENRY
J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WEST VIRGINIA MEDICAID STATE PLAN AMENDMENT: KEY PROGRAM
CHANGES AND QUESTIONS (2oo6), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7529.pdf.
152 Gene Bishop & Amy C. Brodkey, Personal Responsibilily and Physician Responsibility-
West Virginia's Medicaid Plan, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 756, 756 (2OO6).
153 E.g., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 151.
154 See supra Part lI.B.2.
155 BLUE CARE NETWORK OF MICH., supra note 6, at I.
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patient's compliance or accurately reporting the patient's noncompliance
and risk adversely affecting her patient's health (e.g., by reducing the
benefits for which the employee qualifies or raising the cost of the
employee's health coverage).156 Moreover, when patients (rightly) perceive
their doctors as agents of their employers, they may be less inclined to
disclose important health information to their physicians. 57
Increasingly, however, new technologies are eliminating the need for
employers to rely on physicians to monitor employee compliance, as the
development of smaller and cheaper sensors has spawned a dizzying array
of technologies capable of measuring and reporting biometric data.'58 For
example, Corventis, a healthcare technology company, has developed an
adhesive patch "designed to support patient compliance."'59 When stuck
to a patient's chest or back, the patch continuously monitors and wirelessly
transmits information about the patient's temperature, heart rate, respiratory
rate, fluid status, body angle, activity trends, and other variables."6 Proteus
Biomedical uses a similar patch in combination with "smart pills" outfitted
with tiny, digestible microchips.161 When a patient swallows the smart pill,
her stomach acid activates the microchip, which sends a signal to the patch
indicating the pill has been ingested. 6 The patch then transmits that
information to Proteus through the patient's cell phone. 63
As a recent report by the Rand Corporation explains, monitoring
technologies "enable consumers and employers (through a third party) to
accurately track behaviors (such as walking) and biometrics (such as weight
or blood pressure). This capacity might promote sustained engagement
and behavioral change, as well as steady progress toward health goals, thus
providing employers more 'bang' per incentive dollar." 164 Indeed, employers
are showing increasing interest in using remote biometric monitoring in
this way. According to a 2010 survey conducted by Towers Perrin, twenty
156 See Bishop & Brodkey, supra note 152, at 757.
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., Rand & Sevick, supra note I 12, at S245. Rand & Sevick write:
The development of new electronic medication monitoring devices has also cre-
ated the possibility of detailed monitoring of each patient's medication adher-
ence. New assays, devices, tests, and biochemical measures have also expanded
our ability to identify patients who are failing to comply with behavioral recom-
mendations related to smoking, exercise, dietary changes, and alcohol and other
substance abuse.
Id.
159 AVIVO Mobile Patient Management (MPM) System, CORVENTIS, http://www.corventis.
com/us/avivo.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
16o Id.
161 See Pills Get Smart: Potential Encapsulated, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 201o, http://www.
economist.com/node/152 7673o.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 JONES ET AL., supra note 38, at 25.
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percent of "high performing" companies (i.e., companies that have been
most effective at keeping health costs low) indicated they intended to
implement remote biometric monitoring of employees by 2012.65 Large
employers like International Paper and Welch Allyn are employing the
services of RedBrick Health, which provides health insurance plans that
tie employees' premiums to their health behaviors.166 RedBrick offers
employers the option of using wireless devices to monitor, for example, the
amount employees are walking.167
Even employees who may be quite willing to comply with the health
behaviors required by wellness programs may object strongly to their
employer (or their employer's designee) monitoring their exercise habits,
medication compliance, and other health behaviors. For example, a patient
with coronary artery disease "may choose not to take diuretic medicines
prior to a long day of travel, or he or she may choose not to limit dietary
sodium on the occasion of a celebratory meal, despite having agreed to
the treatment plan."1 68 Even if this patient generally wishes to follow his
treatment plan and typically does so, he may object to having to explain the
highly personal reasons for his noncompliance to the administrator of his
wellness program. But if he participates in a coercive incentive program, he
may have little choice but to agree to be monitored in this way.
As monitoring technologies proliferate, it will become feasible for
wellness programs to track an expanding range of employee behaviors that
affect health. To the extent employees object to this kind of monitoring
but feel they have little choice but to consent, wellness programs can inflict
substantial harm on employees.
B. Threats to Health
Some studies have found that people who adopt certain healthy behaviors
ultimately incur greater health care costs because they tend to live longer
and end up making more health care claims. A 2008 study determined that
lifetime health expenditures were highest for "healthy-living people"
(i.e., non-obese non-smokers), lower for obese individuals, and lowest for
smokers. 169 In light of these findings, perhaps proponents of the fairness
165 TOWERS PERRIN, TOWERS PERRIN 2010 HEALTH CARE COST SURVEY Exhibit 9 (2010),
available at www.towersperrin.com/hcg/hcc/HCCS- 9 .pdf.
166 Select RedBrick Clients, REDBRICK HEALTH, http://www.redbrickhealth.com/clients
(last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
167 See Camille Ricketts, Redbrick Gets a $SM Boost for Incentive-Based Health Insurance,
VENTUREBEAT, (Apr. 2, 2OO9), http://venturebeat.com/2009/o4/o2/redbrick-gets-a-15m-
boost-for-incentive-based-health-insurance.
168 Sandman et al., supra note 44, at 116 ("Similar examples can be found in many other
cases, such as diabetes, vascular problems, etc.").
169 Pieter H. M. van Baal et al., Lifetime Medical Costs of Obesity: Prevention No'Cure for
Increasing Health Expenditure, 5 PLOS MED. 242, 245 (2OO8), Hrrp://www.PLOSMEDICINE.ORG/AR-
[Vol. 1o1
THE EROSION OF INFORMED CONSENT
argument-the idea that people whose behaviors drive up health care costs
should pay more-should support charging higher insurance rates to non-
smokers and employees with healthy body weights. Modifying the Valeo
example accordingly, smokers and obese employees would qualify for the
insurance plan with the $400 deductible, while employees who refused to
take up smoking or gain weight would pay $4,400, in recognition of the
extra costs their choices impose on fellow employees.
Clearly such a program would be unethical, and the ACA expressly
prohibits it-the Act's exception to the general prohibition against
discriminating based on health factors applies only to programs that are
"reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease."'70 The ethical
and political justifications for wellness programs rest critically on the
premise that using incentives will improve employee health, constituting
a win-win for employers and employees alike. In this view, substantial
incursions on employee autonomy may be justified because patients will
be better off.
But some employees may not benefit from complying with wellness
program dictates, and in fact may be harmed by them. Looking specifically
at treatment compliance, requiring an employee to follow her physician's
recommendations can actually endanger her health in ways the requirement
of voluntary consent is intended to avoid. 7'
1. The Frailty of Medical Standards.-The key targets of wellness programs
are employees with chronic illnesses, like diabetes, hypertension, and
coronary artery disease. 7 ' For these illnesses there are well-known and
widely-prescribed treatments that comprise the "best practices" doctors
employ in treating these conditions. These are the treatments most likely
to be prescribed to employees suffering from chronic illnesses-and the
treatments employees in some incentive-based programs will have to
agree to undergo in order to be eligible for cheaper health insurance.
Unfortunately there is substantial reason to doubt the efficacy of many
accepted medical practices."' The evidence supporting the benefits of
TICLE/INFO:DOI/IO. 1371/JOURNAL.PMED.0050029. It is important to note that reducing smoking
and obesity could still produce short-term savings for employers, since healthier employees
are likely to incur their higher medical expenses during their retirement years.
17o The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I 11-148, § 1201, 124
Stat. 119, 162 (2010) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(B)).
171 See supra note 148.
172 AON HEWITT, supra note 32, at 5 1.
173 Cannon, supra note 114, at 9-io ("One expert notes that [clinical practice guidelines]
'have been reported to be variably flawed in terms of conflict of interest, specialty turf battles,
endorsement of new or relatively unproven pharmaceutical agents, and focus on a single con-
dition compared with a broader clinical focus."') (quoting Patrick J. O'Connor, Adding Value to
Evidence-Based Clinical Guidelines, 294 JAMA 741, 741 (2005)).
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many interventions is often extremely limited.'74 When medical standards
are subjected to rigorous research, they are reversed with alarming
frequency. One analysis of highly-cited articles published in medical
journals between 1990 and 2003 revealed that nearly a third of the
articles that made claims about the efficacy of an intervention were either
contradicted by subsequent clinical studies or found to have weaker effects
than claimed in the initial articles.7 ' Notably, these numbers reflect only
the highly cited trials with respect to which researchers sought to replicate
the results. Many other highly cited trials are never challenged.'76
Reversals of medical standards are worrisome because every medical
intervention carries risks. Physicians prescribe treatments on the grounds
that their benefits exceed these risks. To the extent medical science
overestimates the benefits of an intervention, patients may be exposed to
risks that are not justified by the treatment's true benefits.'77
One of the key ways in which existing medical standards harm patients
is through pervasive over-treatment.'78 Consider diabetes-the top target
of employers who push participation in disease management programs. 79
The American Diabetes Association, American Heart Association, and
American College of Cardiology all recommend that most adults with
type 2 diabetes achieve a glycated hemoglobin (HbAlc) level below seven
percent to reduce the risk of vascular complications. 80 While accepted
practice involves aggressively lowering HbAlc levels by prescribing
higher levels of therapy, meta-analyses of recent trials found this approach
174 John P. A. loannidis, Contradicted and Initially Stronger Effects in Highly Cited Clinical
Research, 294 JAMA 218, 224 (2005) ("[Flor most clinical questions of interest, no large trials
are ever conducted and evidence is based only on small trials or nonrandomized studies.").
175 Id. at 223 ("16% of the top-cited clinical research articles on postulated effective
medical interventions that have been published within the last 15 years have been contra-
dicted by subsequent clinical studies and another 16% have been found to have initially stron-
ger effects than subsequent research."); see also Vinay Prasad et al., The Frequency of Medical
Reversal, 171 ARCH INTERN MED. 1675, 1676 (zoi) ("The reversal of medical practice is not
uncommon in high-impact literature: 13% of articles that make a claim about a medical prac-
tice constituted reversal in our review of I year of the New England Journal of Medicine. The
range of reversals we encountered is broad and encompasses many arenas of medical practice
including screening tests and all types of therapeutics.").
176 loannidis, supra note 174, at 225.
177 Prasad et al., supra note i75, at 1675.
178 See, e.g., Dario Giugliano & Katherine Esposito, Clinical Inertia as a Clinical Safeguard,
305 JAMA 1591, 1591-92 (201 i) ("[The] failure of [some] health care providers to initiate or
intensify therapy when indicated ... may be a clinical safeguard for the drug-intensive style
of medicine fueled by the current medical literature.... One study found that 58% of medi-
cations could be discontinued in elderly patients and that quality of life improved with drug
discontinuation.") (footnote omitted).
179 AON HEwrrr, supra note 32, at 5 1; REYNOLDS & MARTIN, supra note 45, at 4 ("Diabetes
is-by far-the condition employers are most likely to target with their medication compli-
ance initiatives.").
18o Giugliano & Esposito, supra note 178, at 159i.
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produced only minor benefits. 8 ' On the other hand, the risks of the
intensive-therapy approach were significant. In a massive clinical trial
funded by the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, the all-cause
death rate in the group of patients whose target was a 6% HbAlc level was
22% higher than in the group whose target was between 7-7.9% - that is,
above the recommended 7% level.' Members of the therapy-intensive
group were also more likely to experience weight gain and hypoglycemia
requiring assistance.8 3 The same trial cast doubt on nearly two decades of
guidelines that recommended lower blood pressure goals for patients with
diabetes. 184
Standard medical practice for preventing heart disease, which often
involves using statins to lower cholesterol levels, tells a similar story:
"From 1988-1994 to 2003-2006, the use of statin drugs by adults 45 years
and older increased almost 10-fold, from 2% to 22%. '"1 Although statins
appear to be effective in treating cardiovascular disease, today many
doctors prescribe these drugs for primary prevention-that is, to lower
the risks of heart attacks and strokes among patients who do not have
cardiovascular disease. 8 6 However, meta-analyses of the use of statins for
primary prevention show no benefit in preventing heart attacks or death." 7
Yet the use of statins poses serious risks to patients. Recent studies suggest
statins cause diabetes (itself a major cause of heart disease) in one out of
every 200 patients, or about 100,000 of the twenty million Americans taking
statins 88 Another recent study found that among post-menopausal women
the diabetes risk was dramatically higher.189
Concerns about diabetes management and heart disease prevention
are just two prominent examples among many other reversals regarding
some of the most commonly prescribed interventions, including hormone
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. See also Victor M. Montori and Merce Fernandez-Balsells, Glycemic Control in Tpe
2 Diabetes: Time for an Evidence-BasedAbout-Face?, 15o ANN. INT. MED. 803, 803-08 (2009).
184 Giugliano & Esposito, supra note 178, at 1591.
185 Id. at 1592.
t86 Id.
187 Id. ("Today, many patients are prescribed statins forprimary prevention, although
the short-term benefits, if any, are very small for primary prevention."); Fiona Taylor et al.,
Statins for the primary prevention of cardiovascular disease, THE COCHRANE COLLABORATION 2
(Sept. 7, 2081), http://www.update-software.com/BCP/ileyPDF/EN/CDoo48i6.pdf.
188 Eric J. Topol, The Diabetes Dilemma for Statin, N.Y TIMES, March 4, 2012, http://www
nytimes.com/o 12/03/o5/opinion/the-diabetes-dilemma-for-statin-users.html
189 Annie L. Culver et al., Statin Use and Risk of Diabetes Mellitus in Postmenopausal
Women in the Women's Health Initiative, 172 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 144, 144 (2012 ); see also Kirsten
L. Johansen, Increased Diabetes Mellitus Risk With Statin Use - Tipping the Balance, 1 72 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 152, 152 (2012) ("These data confirm and extend associations previously dem-
onstrated among participants in randomized trials.").
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replacement therapy,190 routine mammograms, 191 and prostate cancer
screenings, 19 to name just a few. In each of these cases the story is the
same: an intervention endorsed by the medical establishment, widely
prescribed by doctors, and undergone by millions of people is later found
to pose little prospect of benefit and serious risks of harm. To the extent
patients are compelled to comply with their doctors' recommendations
even if they would prefer less aggressive therapy, the absence of true
consent can threaten their health.
2. Medical Corruption.-In addition to unavoidable gaps in medical
knowledge, patients face risks from. coerced treatments as a result of
corruption in the medical industry. The clinical trials that test drugs' safety
and efficacy are conducted and interpreted primarily by the companies
that hope to profit from these drugs.193 These studies can be designed
in ways that overstate drugs' benefits and downplay risks. 1' 4 Studies
performed by drug companies are more likely to produce favorable results
than independent studies, and these favorable studies are more likely
to be published in medical journals. 95 Pharmaceutical companies often
lend credibility to these articles by enlisting well-credentialed academic
researchers to claim authorship for articles that were actually ghostwritten
by writers hired by the drug companies. 196
In some cases, drug companies have withheld data that revealed their
drugs posed serious health risks to patients. For example, in 1999 the top
i9o Richard Knox, Hormone Replacement Therapy Raises Risk Of Death From Breast Cancer,
NAT'L PUB. RAio (October 20, 20o), http://www.npr.orglblogslhealth/2010/Io/zo/130693401/
hormone-replacement-therapy-raises-risk-of-death-from-breast-cancer.
19i Gina Kolata, Panel Urges Mammograms at5o, Not 40, N.Y. TIMES, November 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/1 II7/health/17cancer.html.
192 Gardiner Harris, U.S. Panel Says No to Prostate Screening for Healthy Men, N.Y. TMES,
October 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.Com/201 1/1o/07/health/o7prostate.html.
193 Richard Smith, Medical Journals Are an Extension of the MarketingArm of Pharmaceutical
Companies, 2 PLoS MED. 364, 364-65 (zoo5) (noting that between two-thirds and three-
quarters of drug trials published in major medical journals are funded by the pharmaceutical
industry).
194 Id.; see also Bodil Als-Nielsen et al., Association of Funding and Conclusions in
Randomized Drug Trials: A Reflection of Treatment Effect or Adverse Events?, 290 JAMA 92 1, 924
(2003) ("[Clonclusions were significantly more likely to recommend the experimental drug as
treatment of choice in trials funded by for-profit organizations."); Vinay Prasad et al., Reversals
of Established Medical Practices: Evidence to Abandon Ship, 307 JAMA. 37, 38 (2012) ("Asking
corporate sponsors to conduct pivotal trials on their own products is like asking a painter to
judge his or her own painting so as to receive an award.").
195 Als-Nielsen et al., supra note 194; Smith, supra note 193, at 138.
196 Peter C. Gotzsche et al., What Should Be Done To Tackle Ghostwriting in the Medical
Literature?, 6 PLoS MED. 122, 124 (2009) ("Information from questionnaire studies suggest
that authorship in up to io% of published papers could be attributed to ghostwriters, although
the fraction in industry-sponsored clinical trials in one study was considerably higher.");
Simon Stern & Trudo Lemmens, Legal Remedies for Medical Ghostwriting: Imposing Fraud
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antidiabetic drug in the United States was Avandia. Although the drug's
maker, GlaxoSmithKline, conducted its own study in 1999 that linked
Avandia to increased cardiovascular risks, "instead of publishing the
results, the company spent the next 11 years trying to cover them up." 197
In one internal email, a SmithKline executive wrote that "Per Sr. Mgmt
request, these data should not see the light of day to anyone outside of
GSK."'9' In the ensuing years, GSK continued to promote the drug and
doctors continued to prescribe it heavily to diabetics, writing as many
as one million prescriptions per month in 2007.19 That same year the
New England Journal of Medicine published an independently conducted
meta-analysis indicating Avandia increased patients' risk of heart attack
by forty-three percent and increased the risk of death from cardiovascular
causes by sixty-four percent.00 According to a subsequent independent
study, between 1999 and 2009 "more than 47,000 people taking Avandia
needlessly suffered a heart attack, stroke or heart failure, or died.120' Finally
in 2010 European regulators pulled the drug off the market, and the FDA
dramatically restricted its availability.2 2
Recent years have also seen a parade of scandals in which pharmaceutical
companies have illegally promoted their drugs for "off-label" uses-i.e.,
uses for which a drug has not been approved by the FDA. There is nothing
inherently improper about doctors prescribing drugs for off-label uses.
Doctors can prescribe drugs more or less as they see fit," 3 and they do
not hesitate to do so: by one estimate, off-label uses account for about a
fifth of all prescriptions. 04 However, often there is little, if any, evidence
to support certain off-label uses of drugs. 05 And although it is illegal for
Liability on Guest Authors of Ghostwritten Articles, 8 PLoS MED. i, 1 (201 1); Stephanie Saul, Merck
Wrote Drug Studies for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2oo8, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/o416/
business/i 6vioxx.html; Duff Wilson, Drug Maker Said to Pay Ghostwriters for Journal Articles,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/I 2/12/business/13wyeth.html.
197 Gardiner Harris, Diabetes Drug Maker Hid Test Data, Files Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, July 13,
201o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o 10/07/13/health/policy/1 3avandia.html.
198 Id.
I99 Rita Rubin, Avandia Prescriptions Decline AfterStudy, USA TODAY, June 18, 2007, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-o6-1 8-avandiaN.htm.
200 Steven E. Nissen & Kathy Wolski, Effect of Rosiglitazone on the Risk of Myocardial
Infarction and Death from Cardiovascular Causes, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2457, 2457 (2007).
201 Gardiner Harris, ED.A. to RestrictAvandia, CitingHeartRisk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,20 10,
http://www.nytimCs.com/20 I 0/09/2 4/health/pOlicy/24avandia.html?pagewanted=print&-r-o.
202 Id.
203 Michael Wilkes & Margaret Johns, Informed Consent and Shared Decision-Making: A
Requirement to Disclose to Patients Off-Label Prescriptions, 5 PLoS MED. 1553, 1553 (2008).
204 David C. Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, I66
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
205 Wilkes & Johns, supra note 203, at 1553.
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drug companies to promote their drugs for unapproved uses, the practice is
remarkably common in the industry 06
For example, drug-maker AstraZeneca recently paid more than half a
billion dollars to settle federal investigations into illegal marketing of its
drug, Seroquel. °7 Although the FDA approved Seroquel only as a short-term
treatment for schizophrenia and bipolar disorders, the company allegedly
paid kickbacks to doctors 08 as part of an effort to market the drug "for a
variety of illnesses for which it had never been tested, including aggression,
Alzheimer's, anger management, anxiety, attention-deficit hyperactivity
disorder, dementia, depression, mood disorder, post-traumatic stress
disorder and sleeplessness."' 0 9 Internal AstraZeneca emails revealed that
the company had "buried" unfavorable studies about the drug and praised
the company's Seroquel project physician for performing a "great smoke-
and-mirrors job" on negative studies °10 In the year prior to the settlement
Seroquel was the fifth-best-selling drug in the U.S."'
2o6 Prominent recent examples of drugs for which pharmaceutical companies have been
prosecuted for illegally marketing off-label include: Paxil, see Katie Thomas & Michael S.
Schmidt, Glaxo Agrees to Pay $3 Billion in Fraud Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/20 I 2/07/03/business/glaxosmithkline-agrees-to-pay-3-billion-in-fraud-settle-
ment.html; Welbutrin, id.; Depakote, see Michael S. Schmidt & Katie Thomas, Abbott Settles
Marketing Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.Com/2o12/o5/o8/business/
abbott-to-pay-i-6-billion-over-illegal-marketing.html; Risperdal, see Katie Thomas, J.&J.
Fined$I.2 Billion in Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1I, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/20 12/04/12/
business/drug-giant-is-fined-1-2-billion-in-arkansas.html; Detrol, see Margaret Cronin
Fisk, Pfizer Settles Whistle-Blower Suit Over Detrol Marketing, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK., Oct. 20,
2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/20ii-1o-zo/pfizer-settles-whistle-blower-suit-
over-detrol-marketing.html; Seroquel, see Duff Wilson, For $52o Million, AstraZeneca Settles
Case Over Marketing of a Drug, N.Y. TMES, Apr. 27, 20o, http://www.nytimes.com/2o 10/04/28/
business/28drug.html; Bextra, see Rita Rubin, Pfizer Fined $2.3 Billion for Illegal Marketing in
Off-Label Drug Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2oo9, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
health/2009-o9-oz-pfizer-fineN.htm; Zyprexa, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Pharmaceutical Company Eli Lilly to Pay Record $1.45 Billion for Off-Label Drug Marketing,
Jan. 15, 2oo9, http://www.justice.gov/usao/paelNews/Pr/2oo9/jan/lillyrelease.pdf; Abilify, see
Denise Lavoie, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay $5M Settlement, ABC NEWS, Oct. 30, 2007, http://
abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=367o595; and Genotropin, see Pfizer to Pay $35 Mln in
Genotropin Settlements, REUTERS, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/20o7/o4/o2/idUS-
WNAS54472oo 7o4o2.
207 As is common in these settlements, AstraZeneca denied all wrongdoing. Wilson, su-
pra note 2o6.
208 Huma Khan & Pierre Thomas, Drug Giant AstraZeneca to Pay $520 Million to Settle
Fraud Case, ABC NEws (Apr. 27, 201o), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Health/astrazeneca-
pay-52o-million-illegally-marketing-seroquel-schizophrenia/story?id= 10488647.
209 Id.
2 I0 Wilson, supra note 2o6; see also Carl Elliott, Making a Killing, MOTHER JONES, Sept.-
Oct. 201o at 59 (noting internal AstraZeneca emails in which a company official states "Thus
far, we have buried trials 15, 31, 56.... The larger issue is how do we face the outside world
when they begin to criticize us for suppressing data.").
211 Wilson, supra note 2o6.
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Common side effects of Seroquel include chills, cold sweats, confusion
and dizziness. The drug also carries several dozen "less common" (though
not "rare") side effects that include drooling, slurred speech, unusual facial
expressions and spasms, rapid or worm-like movements of the tongue,
inability to move the eyes, trembling hands, ulcers around the mouth,
and trouble with breathing, speaking, or swallowing."' 2 Patients who are
prescribed Seroquel to treat conditions for which its benefits have not been
established are subjected to risks of these and many other side effects, with
highly questionable prospects of experiencing any benefit.
For most patients prescribed Avandia or Seroquel, 1l3 the requirement
of voluntary consent offers a layer of protection against the dangers of
these drugs: patients who disagree with their doctors' assessment of the
drugs' risk/benefit profiles can unilaterally discontinue use of the drugs.
For example, researchers began raising well-publicized, serious concerns
about Avandia's risks in 200714 and at least one FDA safety official called
for the drug to be taken off the market that same year2 1 -more than three
years before the FDA finally restricted access to the drug." 6 Yet doctors
still wrote 2.6 million Avandia prescriptions in 2009 alone. 7 During
this period, patients who were concerned about the drug's risks could
protect themselves by discontinuing use of the drug, even if their doctors
continued to recommend taking it-but only if their voluntary consent was
intact. Undermining patients' autonomy in making treatment decisions
compounds the dangers of unethical drug company practices by eroding
patients' ability to protect themselves.
Notwithstanding serious doubts about some of the most commonly
accepted and prescribed interventions, it may be that in most cases
overriding patients' treatment preferences would promote their health. But
even if this were always the case, there are other important reasons to respect
212 Quetiapine (Oral Route): Side effects, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/
drug-information/DR6o493/DSECTION=side-effects (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
213 Or both. AstraZeneca also allegedly failed to disclose studies showing Seroquel in-
creases the risk of diabetes. Wilson, supra note 2o6.
214 Nissen & Wolski, supra note 2oo, at 2467 (finding that treatment with Avandia was
"associated with a significant increase in the risk of myocardial infarction"); Gardiner Harris,
More Studies Cast Doubt on Safety of Diabetes Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, http://www.ny-
times.com/2oo7/o9/ 2/health/I 2drug.html; Stephanie Saul, Another Study Finds Heart Risks in a
Diabetes Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,2007, http://www.nytimes.com/zoo7/I2/Iz/business/i2drug.
html; Stephanie Saul, Heart Attack Risk Seen in Drug for Diabetes, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/o5/22/business/22drug.html.
215 Gardiner Harris, U.S. Drug Safety Official Recommends Avandia Be Withdrawn, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/zoo7/o7/3o/business/worldbusiness/3oiht-
drug.4.69o2o82.html.
216 Gardiner Harris, FD.A. to Restrict Avandia, Citing Heart Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
2oo, http://www.nytimes.com/zo0/09/24/health/policy/24avandia.html.
217 Duff Wilson, Avandia's Sales Drop Far Behind Actos, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 20o, http://
prescriptions.blogs.nytimes.com/2o'o/o7/ z/avandias-sales-drop-far-behind-actos/.
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patients' treatment decisions-e.g., because patients value things other
than health, and have a compelling interest in controlling their own bodies.
The shortcomings of medical knowledge and the corruption of medical
practice simply lend additional urgency to protecting patients' autonomy. If
a physician recommends a treatment based on the best available evidence
and an informed patient voluntarily consents to it, the patient has not been
"wronged" even if the treatment harms her health. If, however, a patient is
injured by an intervention she was effectively compelled to undergo, the
harm to her health compounds the injury to her autonomy.
C. Personal Values and Self-Determination
Even when a treatment promotes a patient's health, it still may not be
in the patient's best interest. 1 People value things other than maximum
health, and even the idea of "maximum health" is itself subjective. Some
people are more risk-averse than others. Some place a higher value on
living longer, others on better quality of life. As Cynthia Rand and Mary
Sevick have argued:
The best medical outcome may not be the patients' primary
goals nor in the patients' overall best interests. Patients
generally balance medical goals against the costs associated
with treatment. When patients experience unforeseen adverse
events or side effects as a result of the treatment, they may
determine that it is in their best interest to reduce or discontinue
treatment.... Finally, treatment may not address the symptoms
that are most bothersome to the patients. When patients are
urged to comply to achieve medical treatment goals and to do so
at the expense of something that they value more, the clinician
has not behaved in the best interest of the patients.219
Consider tamoxifen. In a world in which there are few interventions
known to be highly effective in lowering cancer risks, tamoxifen is a wonder
drug.2 0 For women who have an elevated risk of contracting breast cancer,
tamoxifen cuts their risk in half."'1 If you were interested in promoting
the health of women in a population and minimizing health care costs,
218 Rand & Sevick, supra note 112, at S242 ("[Cilinicians and patients may differ in their
understanding of the problem being treated and the goals of treatment. While clinicians and
researchers are interested in cure rates, improvements in biophysiologic measures, and reduc-
tions in health service use, patients are likely to be more interested in the impact of treatment
on their quality of life."); Sandman et al., supra note 44, at 1 17 (noting the traditional model of
compliance has been criticized for "its emphasis on biomedical goals and its lack of emphasis
on the short and longer-term life-goals of the patient.").
219 Rand & Sevick, supra note 112, at S242.
22o Gina Kolata, Medicines to Deter Some Cancers Are Not Taken, N.Y. TMEs, Nov. 13, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/1 1/13/health/research/I 3prevent.html?pagewanted=all&gwh=
ADD8E F9A76BC73AI 837CC44A98 1 CoC89.
221 Id.
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tamoxifen seems like a no-brainer for at-risk women. Doctors know which
patients are most likely to benefit, the benefits are substantial, and the
most common side effects often are not considered serious. As TheNew York
Times' Tara Parker-Pope asked, "If someone invented a pill to cut a cancer
risk in half, would you take it? Who wouldn't?" 12
The answer, Ms. Pope noted, is "millions of women."' 13 Even when
women are informed that their lifetime risk of breast cancer is twenty
percent-double the average risk-about half turn down tamoxifen114 And
among those who begin treatment, many abandon it before completing the
five-year treatment course.2 5 The most common reason women refuse to
take tamoxifen is concern about its side-effects.2 6 Tamoxifen can cause
hot flashes, urinary problems, fatigue, weight gain, severe joint pain, and
numerous other unpleasant effects."2 7 It also raises the risk of endometrial
cancer, blood clots, cataracts, and other health problems.2 8 From the
perspective of doctors whose objective is to help patients avoid tumors,
these risks pale compared to the benefits of taking tamoxifen. Yet when
researchers at the University of Michigan clearly spelled out the benefits
and risks of the drug to a group of research participants, only six percent
said they would consider taking it. 29
From a public health perspective, refusing tamoxifen looks like the
kind of irrational health decision that might be remedied by using financial
incentives to alter women's risk/benefit assessments. Indeed, health
researchers refer to this kind of choice as an example of common "decision
errors that contribute to poor health-related behaviors." 3 ' Drawing on
behavioral economics, some researchers describe patients' refusal to take
an effective intervention as a form of "omission bias": overemphasizing low
risks of harm that might result from taking action (such as taking tamoxifen)
and deemphasizing higher risks of harm from failing to act.2 3' Others argue
people err by placing too much weight on the present rather than the
future, which leads us to avoid the immediate costs of taking medications
222 Tara Parker-Pope, When Lowering the Odds of Cancer Isn't Enough, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 14,
2oo9, http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/ 12/14/when-lowering-the-odds-of-cancer-isnt-en
ough/?gwh=7Al329D465 I1E05439AAD8A3 I6oF 3 69AI.
223 Id.
224 Kolata, supra note 220.
225 Christian Nordqvist, Breast Cancer Drug Abandoned by 36% of Patients Due to Side
Effects, MEDICAL NEWS TODAY (Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/arti-
cles/239oo.php.
226 See Elizabeth A. Grunfeld et al., Adherence Beliefs Among Breast Cancer Patients Taking
Tamoxifen, 59 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 97, 101 (2005); Parker-Pope, supra note 222.
227 Grunfeld et al., supra note 226, at 97, 99; Nordqvist, supra note 225.
228 Parker-Pope, supra note 222.
229 Id.
230 Volpp et al., supra note 56, at 389.
231 Parker-Pope, supra note 222.
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that offer "delayed and often uncertain benefits of better health years
later." 3' As behavioral economist Dan Ariely puts it, "[t]he problem is
that it's all about trading off the long-term future with the short-term
consequences .... It turns out that when we are faced with this tradeoff, we
often make the wrong choice." '33
Cecilia Anderson may be the poster child for this short-term-oriented
"wrong choice." Although the fifty-seven-year-old has a one-in-five
lifetime risk of breast cancer, she declined tamoxifen because she found
it incompatible with her active lifestyle. 3 4 "I felt like my quality of life
was in question . . . .I am busy, I am out there. I totally love my life
and don't want it to be compromised," Ms. Anderson explained. 3 The
behavioral economics view suggests Ms. Anderson has placed too much
emphasis on her present quality of life-a decision she may come to regret
if she develops breast cancer. But then there is Kay Wissmann, who was
prescribed tamoxifen to prevent a recurrence of breast cancer. She stopped
taking the drug "because it made her feel terrible and exhausted. 236 Even
when her breast cancer did recur, Ms. Wissman continued to believe she
had made the right decision in discontinuing the drug.37
What looks to economists like an irrational decision can also be explained
as a difference in values. Patients are not interested in maximizing societal
utility but in living a life. The decision of whether and to what extent
to sacrifice one's current quality of life in exchange for potential future
benefits is a deeply personal decision that includes costs that are not
captured in economic analysis. For example, in one study of tamoxifen
noncompliance two patients cited religious fasting as their reason for failing
to comply with their prescriptions. 38 Noncompliance with tamoxifen is also
higher among women who have undergone chemotherapy.39 For women
who are just starting to emerge from the physical and emotional trauma
of chemotherapy and experience crippling side effects from tamoxifen,
the certainty of spending the next five years in misery in the hopes of
avoiding a future event that may never occur-or that may occur despite
the drug-may be too much to bear. 4° Declining to take tamoxifen under
232 Volpp et al., supra note 56, at 389.
233 Huff, supra note 84.
234 Kolata, supra note 220.
235 Id.
236 Andrew Pollack, Take Your Pills, All Your Pills, N.Y. TIMEs, March I I, 2oo6, at Ci.
237 Id.
238 Vedang Murthy et al., Tamoxifen Non-Compliance: Does it Matter?, 3 THE LANCET
ONCOLOGY 654 (2002).
239 See Nordqvist, supra note 225.
240 See id. ("If they had a rough time with chemo, if they're feeling beaten up by treat-
ment and medications, or if they're the type of person who has difficulty tolerating side ef-
fects, then they're much more likely to quit the drugs early.").
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these circumstances may end up increasing health care costs, but it cannot
be fairly characterized as a "decision error."
Using incentives to compel patients to conform to economists'
assessments of their best interests is a radical departure from current
standards of medical ethics. Until advocates of this approach establish that
its benefits outweigh the costs to patients' autonomy, wellness programs
should be required to conform to existing ethical standards. As described
below, however, the laws that regulate these programs do little to ensure
that result.
IV. THE NEED FOR ENHANCED LEGAL PROTECTIONS
A. Legal Protections Against Discrimination Do Not Protect Patient Autonomy
1. Legal Protections Against Discrimination.-Several ACA and HIPAA
provisions are designed to protect against discrimination in the provision
of employer-sponsored health insurance while enabling employers to
promote employee health. 4' The ACA, which incorporates HIPAA's anti-
discrimination provisions and related regulations, 4 bars group health plans
from establishing rules for eligibility 43 or charging higher premiums"
241 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 11 1-148, § 1201, 124
Star. i 19, 156 (201 O) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2011)) (entitled "Prohibiting
Discrimination against Individual Participants and Beneficiaries Based on Health Status");
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (same). In
addition to the ACA and HIPAA, several other federal and state laws can regulate wellness
programs. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. i 10-233, 122
Star. 881 (2oo8), limits employers' ability to collect employees' genetic information. Anita K.
Chancey, Getting Healthy: Issues to Consider Before Implementing a Wellness Program, J. HEALTH
LIFE Sci. LAW, Apr. 2oo9, at 73, 73. Many states have laws that prohibit employers from dis-
criminating based on certain aspects of an employee's "lifestyle," including off-duty smoking.
Jesson, supra note 38, at 265-67. However, in the context of wellness programs that are part
of group health benefit plans offered by self-insured employers, these state laws are gener-
ally preempted by the Employee Retirement Investment Security Act. Id. at 265 & n.212.
Most notably, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title 1, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2oo6),
limits employers' ability to discriminate against disabled individuals-i.e., "individuals with
a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity." Jesson, supra
note 38, at 256. The ADA also prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee
for declining to submit to medical examinations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2011). The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has issued no formal guidance regarding the extent to
which the ADA may constrain wellness programs that comply with ACA and HIPAA require-
ments. Chancey at 73.
242 Compare Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 1 1-148, §
1201, 124 Stat. 119, 156-6o (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (zoI I)), with
29 C.ER. § 2590.702(f) (2012).
243 § 1201, 124 Stat. at 156 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 30ogg-4(a) (2o I)).
244 Id. at 154-55 (2oo) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-4(b) (2011)).
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based on any individual's or dependent's health status or medical history. 4
However, the statute carves out an exception that expressly authorizes
offering lower premiums or deductibles "in return for adherence to
programs of health promotion and disease prevention."' 4
6
Wellness programs that do not tie rewards to satisfying a particular
health standard are not subject to the Act's anti-discrimination provisions. 47
Examples of exempt programs include rewarding employees who attend
a monthly health education seminar or participate in a diagnostic testing
program, without regard to employees' health outcomes. 48 Because these
kinds of programs do not tie employees' insurance contributions to meeting
particular health standards that sick people may not be able to achieve or to
activities sick people cannot undertake, they seem to present little danger
of discrimination and are therefore exempt from the anti-discrimination
provisions.
By contrast, wellness programs that tie rewards or penalties 49 to
achieving a health status must meet several requirements designed to
mitigate the potential for these programs to punish employees for health
factors beyond their control.5 0 First, a program's reward must not exceed
thirty percent of the total cost of coverage, including both the employees'
and the employers' contributions.5 ' In other words, if the employer's
total per capita cost of insuring its employees is $15,000, it may charge
up to $4,500 more to employees who do not meet the wellness program's
standards. The ACA empowers the Secretaries of Labor, HHS, and the
Treasury to increase this cap to up to fifty percent of the cost of coverage if
they deem it appropriate."2
Second, the ACA requires that wellness programs "be reasonably
designed to promote health or prevent disease." '53 To meet this broad
standard the program must have "a reasonable chance of improving the
health of or preventing disease in participating individuals," must not be
245 Id. at i56 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-4(a) (201 1)).
246 Id. at 154-55 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(b)(2)(B) (2011)).
247 Id. at 157 (zoio) (codified as amended at 4z U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j0)(1B) (2011)).
248 Id. at 157 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(2) (20 11)).
249 "A reward may be in the form of a discount or rebate of a premium or contribution,
a waiver of all or part of a cost-sharing mechanism (such as deductibles, copayments, or co-
insurance), the absence of a surcharge, or the value of a benefit that would otherwise not be
provided under the plan." Id. at I58 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)
(A) (2011 )).
250 Id. at 157 (2oo) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)()(C) (2011)).
251 Id. at 157-58 (2010) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(A) (2011)).
HIPAA previously imposed a cap of twenty percent. 29 C.ER. 25 9 0. 702(f)(2)(i) (2012). The
ACA's key amendment with respect to wellness programs was to raise this cap.
252 § 1201, 124 Stat. at 158 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(A) (2011 )).
253 Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(B) (2011)).
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overly burdensome, and must not be "a subterfuge for discriminating based
on a health status factor." '54
Third, "[tihe full reward under the wellness program shall be made
available to all similarly situated individuals." '5 To meet this requirement,
the program must accommodate individuals for whom it is either medically
inadvisable or unreasonably difficult due to a medical condition to satisfy
the generally applicable standard for obtaining the reward. 56 For these
individuals, the wellness program must either provide a reasonable
alternative standard for obtaining the reward or waive the standard
altogether for that individual. 57 A plan may seek verification, such as
a statement from an employee's physician, that a health factor makes it
unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable for the individual to satisfy
or attempt to satisfy the otherwise applicable standard.
5 8
These provisions seek to strike a balance between the potential for
wellness programs to improve health and cut costs and the need to protect
sick people from discrimination. Thus, for example, the Act permits
charging higher rates to people who cannot meet a wellness program's
targeted health outcomes but limits the impact to thirty percent of the
total cost of insurance. The Act also seeks to ensure that wellness programs
genuinely seek to improve health, rather than simply charge more to
unhealthy people, and requires accommodating people whose illnesses
prevent them from achieving targeted health outcomes or undertaking
certain activities.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3oogg-4(J)(3)(D)(i)(I)--(II) (zoi )).
257 Id.
258 Id. In addition to these three requirements, the ACA requires that "[t]he plan shall
give individuals eligible for the program the opportunity to qualify for the reward under the
program at least once per year," id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(C)
(2o I)), and that the health plan "shall disclose in all plan materials describing the terms of
the wellness program the availability of a reasonable alternative standard (or the possibility of
waiver of the otherwise applicable standard)." Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
4(j)(3)(E) (201 1)).
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2. Anti-Discrimination Provisions Do Not Protect Autonomy.-While these
rules limit discrimination based on health factors, they are decidedly less
well-suited to protecting employee autonomy. 59 As an initial matter, it
is not clear whether the ACA's anti-discrimination protections apply to
programs that tie rewards to certain health behaviors, such as medication
compliance, as opposed to achieving particular health outcomes.,,6 The
Act's restrictions on wellness programs apply only to programs in which
"any of the conditions for obtaining a ...reward ... is based on an
individual satisfying a standard that is related to a health status factor." ''
The restrictions do not apply to programs that tie rewards to employees'
"participation" in the program rather than to the achievement of certain
outcomes.
It is not clear whether a program that ties rewards to employees'
compliance with their physicians' recommendations, but does not base
rewards on the achievement of particular health outcomes, is subject to the
ACA's restrictions. Would regulators view this arrangement as rewarding
"participation" in a program to manage chronic illness, like exempt
programs that tie incentives to attending health education classes? Or
would this more closely resemble a program that ties rewards to meeting a
particular cholesterol level? Note that the purpose of the ACA's restrictions
is to mitigate the potential for discrimination against people who cannot
achieve certain health outcomes, or cannot undertake certain activities,
because of a sickness or disability. 6 That concern does not seem to apply
to incentives for an employee to take the actions a doctor has determined
will best promote her health. Accordingly, regulators might determine this
kind of program is exempt from the Act's wellness provisions.
Even if the ACA's anti-discrimination provisions do apply to this kind of
program, they are still inadequate to protect employee autonomy. First, the
Act's caps on the size of permissible incentives are set far too high to protect
voluntary consent. According to a report by the Kaiser Family Foundation,
in 2011 the average annual health insurance premium for employer-
sponsored coverage was more than $15,000 for family coverage.163 Under
259 See, e.g., Madison et al.,supra note 24, at 462-63 (noting that the ACA's cap on the size
of wellness incentives could offer some protection for patient voluntariness, "but the ceiling is
not particularly well suited for this task").
26o See Schmidt et al., supra note 57, at e3(0) (interpreting HIPAA regulations, subse-
quently codified in the ACA, as distinguishing between "participation incentives," in which
incentives are tied to "participation" in a health-promotion program, and "attainment incen-
tives" "which provide reimbursements for only meeting targets-for example, a particular
body-mass index or cholesterol level").
z61 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3oogg-4(j)(1)(C) (201 i)) (emphasis added).
262 Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (201 i)) (entitled "Prohibiting dis-
crimination against individual participants and beneficiaries based on health status").
263 ThE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDuC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
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the ACA's thirty percent cap on incentives, employers with average health
insurance costs could increase noncompliant employees' contributions
by up to $4,500 per year. For an employee with a household income of
$50,000-the median household income in the United States64-$4,500
is nearly ten percent of that employee's annual pre-tax income. Moreover,
the ACA gives the federal government authority to raise the incentive cap
to as high as fifty percent of the total cost of coverage, or $7,500 under
an average-cost employer-sponsored plan. 65 Under these caps, any
employee who cannot pay an additional $4,500 to $7,500 in deductibles
or an additional $375 to $625 in monthly premiums may have to choose
between complying with the wellness program or going without coverage.
Other anti-discrimination provisions likewise do little to protect
patient autonomy. While the Act requires that wellness programs must
not be "overly burdensome," '66 this requirement refers to the program's
overall design-not the burdens a particular individual may experience in
achieving the targeted standard. This requirement is one component of the
rules that require a wellness program to be "reasonably designed to promote
health or prevent disease" and not "a subterfuge for discriminating based
on a health status factor."2' 6 A program that ties incentives to following
doctors' recommendations presumably would not, as a matter of program
design, constitute a "highly suspect.., method . .. to promote health,"
which this portion of the statute prohibits26 -- regardless of whether such a
program would impose significant burdens on some employees. 69
The ACA's requirements that wellness programs accommodate people
who cannot meet certain health targets appear closer to the mark, insofar
as they relate to the burdens individuals may experience in seeking
to comply with wellness program requirements. On closer inspection,
however, these provisions do not protect employees' right to decline a
course of treatment recommended by their physicians. The Act requires
employers to accommodate individuals for whom it is inadvisable or
unreasonably difficult to comply with wellness program requirements-
but only if doing so is medically inadvisable or unreasonably difficult due
BENEFITS 201 I ANNUAL SURVEY 1 (201 1), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/zoi i/8225.pdf.
264 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 § 13, at 452
tbl.690 (2012), available at http:/www.census.gov/compendia/statab/201 z/tables/1 2so69 i.pdf.
265 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§ 30099-4(J)(3)(A) (2o011I)).
266 Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(B) (2oIi)).
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 See, e.g., Madison et al., supra note 24, at 457 (arguing that "[d]ifferences in program
participants' abilities to respond to incentives . . . do not necessarily imply that incentive
programs impermissibly discriminate," in part because "[tlhe individuals facing the most sig-
nificant barriers may have the most to gain from incentive programs").
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to a medical condition.7 0 That is not a determination a patient can make
on her own. Rather, employers are entitled to "seek verification, such as a
statement from the individual's physician" attesting to the fact that a health
factor makes it unreasonably difficult or inadvisable for the employee to
comply."' If a wellness program merely requires an employee to obey his
doctors' recommendations, clearly a physician is not going to certify that
her own prescriptions are unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable
for the patient to follow. These provisions offer no protection to patients
who would prefer to decline treatments recommended by their doctors.
In sum, the ACA does not require employers to accommodate
individuals who object to treatments prescribed by their doctors. On the
contrary, in the examples recited in the applicable regulations, following
a doctor's recommendations is the accommodation offered to employees
who cannot meet the health standard required of other employees."'2 One
example considers a wellness program in which employees who achieve
a cholesterol count under 200 receive an annual premium discount of
twenty percent of the cost of their coverage. 73 The plan provides that it
will accommodate any participant for whom it is unreasonably difficult to
achieve a count under 200:
Individual D begins a diet and exercise program but is unable
to achieve a cholesterol count under 200 within the prescribed
period. D's doctor determines D requires prescription medication
to achieve a medically advisable cholesterol count. In addition,
the doctor determines that D must be monitored through
periodic blood tests to continually reevaluate D's health status.
The plan accommodates D by making the discount available
to D, but only if D follows the advice of D's doctor's regarding
medication and blood tests.
274
270 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)
(3)(D)(i)(I)-(II) (2011 )).
271 Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(D)(ii) (2011)).
272 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) exs. 3 & 4 (2oi2). While these examples are found in
regulations implementing HIPAA, they apply with equal force to the ACA's wellness provi-
sions. The ACA adopted and codified HIPAA regulations of wellness programs, while modify-
ing the size of incentives permitted under these regulations. Compare Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act § 1201 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4) (201 I), with 29 C.ER.
§ 2590.702(f) (2012).
273 29 C.ER. § 2590.702(f)(3) ex. 3 (2012). This example uses the twenty percent cap
provided for in the HIPAA regulations. 29 C.ER. § 2590.702(f)(2)(i) (2012). The ACA raised
that limit to thirty percent of the total cost of coverage. Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(J)(3)(A) (2011)).
274 29 C.ER. § 2590.702(f)(3) ex. 3 (2012).
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The regulations conclude that this program is permissible and that it
adequately accommodates D by providing a reasonable alternative standard
for obtaining the discount. 75
Thus, the regulations protect D against discrimination based on his
health status by ensuring that he is not penalized for failing to meet targets
that his health prevents him from achieving But it does not protect D's
right to choose his course of treatment, free from substantially controlling
influences. If D faces a $4,500 increase in his health insurance costs for
refusing his prescription medications-and particularly if he cannot afford
health insurance for his family after imposition of that penalty-the
voluntariness of D's consent is seriously undermined.
As described above, there are many valid reasons a patient may wish to
refuse a treatment that a physician believes would promote the patient's
health. 76 But the ACA's anti-discrimination provisions offer no protection
for employees who do not wish to undergo the treatments recommended
by their physicians.
B. Recommended Enhancements
In light of the ethical imperative to reduce health care costs and the
attractiveness of doing so by promoting health, it may be appropriate
to make limited use of incentives to encourage people to improve their
health. But any such use should be subject to clearly defined limits, which
currently do not exist. Just as the ACA seeks to encourage programs that
promote health while protecting against discrimination, the laws and
regulations governing wellness programs should also protect against undue
infringements on patients' autonomy.
The ACA provides an opportunity to raise these issues. The Act requires
the Secretary of HHS to submit a report to Congress evaluating "the
effectiveness of wellness programs ... in promoting health and preventing
disease," "the impact of such wellness programs on the access to care and
affordability of coverage for participants and non-participants of such
programs," "the impact of premium-based and cost-sharing incentives on
participant behavior and the role of such programs in changing behavior,"
and "the effectiveness of different types of rewards." '77 The Secretary
should use this report to highlight the potential for wellness programs to
275 See also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) ex. 4 (2012) (endorsing a wellness program in
which a participant for whom it is medically inadvisable or unreasonably difficult due to a
medical condition to achieve the targeted health standard can still receive the applicable re-
ward as long as he follows his physician's recommendations).
276 Seesupra Part III.
277 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-4(m) (zo )).
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undermine employee autonomy and to recommend modifications to the
ACA to curtail problematic uses of incentives.
As an initial matter, the report should include a frank, thorough, and
nuanced acknowledgement of the threats wellness programs can pose to
voluntariness and the potential harms that can result. Since these concerns
have received scant attention in political debates and academic literature,
the HHS report represents an opportunity to alert policymakers and
stakeholders to hidden costs of the Act's wellness provisions.
The Secretary should also use the report to offer three specific
recommendations to protect employee autonomy. First, the ACA's wellness
provisions should be amended to make explicit that the Act's anti-
discrimination provisions apply not only to programs that tie incentives
to particular health targets but also to those that reward compliance with
particular health behaviors. In the Act's current form, the line between
rewarding achievement of particular health outcomes and incentivizing
employee "participation" in particular activities is not at all clear."' 8 If
the ACA does not apply to programs that tie incentives to employees
undertaking particular behaviors, there are few limits on employers' ability
to penalize non-disabled employees for failing to diet, adopt a particular
exercise regime, or take prescribed medications.279
Second, even if the ACA's anti-discrimination provisions apply to
behavior-based programs, they are inadequate to protect patient autonomy.
The Secretary should recommend sharply reducing the size of incentives
employers may use to promote employee compliance with wellness
programs. Many employees could not afford health insurance if required
to pay the maximum penalties permitted by the ACA. Employees' access
to affordable health insurance should not depend on their willingness to
comply with wellness program requirements.
The ACA's approach to limiting incentives is particularly problematic
for lower income workers. The Act ties the size of permissible penalties
to the employer's total per capita cost of insuring its employees, which
has no relation to employees' ability to afford these penalties. 8 ° Unlike
their lower-earning peers, higher income workers who can afford increased
health insurance contributions can refuse to comply with wellness program
requirements without threatening the welfare of their families. Under these
circumstances, voluntary consent is transformed from a core, universal
ethical requirement to a commodity that can be purchased by individuals
who can afford to pay more for health insurance. In order to protect the
autonomy of all employees, the Secretary should recommend modifying
278 Seesupra Part IV.A.2.
279 The Americans with Disabilities Act provides additional protections for disabled em-
ployees. See supra note 241.
280 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)
(3)(A) (20 1)).
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the ACA's incentive caps so that either they are so small that they cannot
coerce even low income employees, or they are tied not to an employer's
insurance costs but to individual employees' ability to pay.
Finally, although limiting the size of incentives is the simplest and most
effective way to protect employee autonomy, if Congress will not make
those changes HHS should recommend amendments that bar employers
from penalizing workers for failing to follow their doctors' recommendations.
Decisions regarding whether to take medications must be made voluntarily
by patients, without threat of penalty.
Constraining the use of incentives in these ways might (or might not)
reduce the effectiveness of certain wellness approaches in lowering health
care costs. But it is critical to assess the total costs of any given approach,
including non-monetary costs such as diminished privacy and autonomy.
If protections that are essential to ensuring a basic level of patient
autonomy make some wellness approaches less effective, so be it. That
may be a compelling reason to favor a different mix of strategies. This is
particularly true in light of the current paucity of evidence that incentive
programs actually improve health or reduce costs."8 ' Rather than worrying
that limiting the use of incentives will undermine the effectiveness of
wellness programs, we ought to worry about eroding patient autonomy
based on hope in, and hype about, an unproven theory. A more sensible
approach would be to implement limited pilot projects to study the efficacy
of different incentive program designs in promoting health and reducing
costs and to determine how those programs are experienced by patients.
Only when we know what society stands to gain from incentive programs
can we determine how much we should be willing to sacrifice for them.
CONCLUSION
Patient autonomy is not a moral absolute that can never be compromised.
Any assessment of the propriety of using incentives to modify patient
behaviors must take into account competing demands of fairness and
responsible stewardship of scarce health care resources. No one is well
served by policies that foreclose improvements to public health or unduly
hamper the ability of employers-who provide health benefits to most
of the nation's insured individuals2 5 -to reduce health care costs. Given
the attractiveness of achieving these objectives by improving employees'
health, there may be some role for using financial incentives to nudge
people to take better care of themselves.
281 See supra note 56.
282 See STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA AssISTANCE CTR., STATE-LEVEL TRENDS IN EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE i (201 I), available at http://www.shadac.orgfiles/shadac/pub-
lications/ESITrendsJun2ol i.pdf (stating sixty-one percent of nonelderly Americans re-
ceived health insurance through employers in 2008-2009).
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That said, when employees must choose between complying with
wellness program requirements or losing access to affordable health
insurance, this approach looks less like a nudge than a shove. Allowing
employers to threaten noncompliant employees with such a serious harm is
a radical departure from existing ethical standards requiring that patients'
consent to treatment be free from substantially controlling influences. Only
an individual patient can determine whether the benefits of a treatment
outweigh its risks, based on her own values, circumstances, and personal
experience with a treatment. Voluntary consent should not be a privilege
available only to those who can afford higher premiums.
We should think carefully before contravening the fundamental
requirement that competent, adult patients retain control over decisions
regarding their own bodies. Yet to date advocates of using financial
incentives to shape patient behavior have failed to even acknowledge how
this strategy can undermine informed consent, let alone supply evidence
that wellness programs' benefits justify these incursions. Until we have
had a thorough airing of the risks and potential benefits of this strategy,
Congress should amend the laws governing wellness programs to conform
to current ethical standards.
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